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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On August 13-15, 2000, the Ogden Civil Service Commission (the "Commission") 
held a hearing on Anthony Huemiller's ("Huemiller") appeal of his termination from the 
Ogden City Police Department (the "Department" or "OCPD"). On November 20, 2001, 
the Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (the 
"Decision") affirming Huemiller's termination. On December 10, 2001, Huemiller 
timely filed a Writ for Review of the Decision. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 and Utah R.App.P. 14. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Should the factual allegations against Huemiller be summarily 
affirmed due to Huemiller's failure to marshal the evidence on appeal? 
Standard of Review: "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9); 
Whitear v. Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). If an appellant fails 
to marshal evidence, the appellate court will not address a challenge to factual findings 
and must assume they are correct. Id. at 985; see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305, 312 (Utah 1998). 
2. Issue: Based on Huemiller's refusal to respond to the allegations against 
him during the predetermination hearing before OCPD Chief Jon Greiner ("Chief 
Greiner"), did Huemiller waive any appeal regarding the factual allegations and Chief 
Greiner's action of termination? 
Standard of Review: Failure to raise an issue below results in waiver of 
1 
any objections related to that issue. Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm 'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation of Issue: During the May 11, 2000, predetermination hearing, 
Huemiller was informed of the facts and allegations against him, and had the opportunity 
to be heard and to refute the allegations or provide explanations. See R. 347-372, at 347 
(Predet. Hrg. Trans.). He refused to respond with particularity to the allegations, took the 
fifth amendment, and simply offered general denials. See R. 347-372, passim. 
3. Issue: Does the Commission's finding that Huemiller "was not a credible 
witness" during the hearing require the Court to defer to the Commission's finding that 
Huemiller misrepresented the truth? 
Standard of Review: Appellate courts may not "determine the credibility 
of conflicting evidence or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom," and must 
defer to the trial court in such assessments. See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, 
ffl[ 27-29, 76 P.3d 1173 (citations omitted); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
(appellate court "cannot hope to garner from a cold record" a sense of proceedings or 
credibility of witnesses). An appellate court does not "review the Commission's findings 
de novo or reweigh the evidence," and "defers to the Commission's findings on issues of 
credibility." Lucas v. Murray Civil Serv. Comm % 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
4. Issue: In light of the substantial evidence that supported the Commission's 
findings, did the Commission err in affirming Chief Greiner's termination of Huemiller, 
and in finding that: (a) Huemiller "misrepresented the truth"; (b) Huemiller "was 
insubordinate"; (c) Huemiller "had a conflict of interest"; (d) Huemiller violated OCPD 
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policies; and/or (e) Huemiller had engaged in conduct unbecoming a police officer? 
Standard of Review: With regard to factual findings, a civil service 
commission's task is only to determine "whether the facts support the charges made by 
the department head." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758; see also Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. 
Comm 'n, 2000 UT App 235, f 16, 8 P.3d 1048 ("Commission must determine if 
discipline was warranted"). A commission's findings then are reviewed on appeal under 
a "substantial evidence" standard, and in light of the entire record. Ld. Substantial 
evidence "is that quantum and quantity of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion. Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758 (citations omitted). The 
appellate court does not "review the Commission's findings de novo or reweigh the 
evidence," and "defers to the Commission's findings on issues of credibility." Ld. The 
appellate court employs a clearly erroneous standard in assessing whether to overturn a 
Commission's factual findings. Kelly, 2000 UT App 235,115, 8 P.3d 1048. 
5. Was the discipline imposed on Humemiller appropriate, given Huemiller's 
misconduct, the fact that two other officers who engaged in similar misconduct were also 
terminated, and the fact that the undisputed evidence establishes that OCPD terminates 
employees who lie in Internal Affairs investigations? 
Standard of Review: The second task of a Commission is to determine 
whether the discipline imposed was appropriate. Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, ^ f 165 8 P.3d 
1048. In determining whether charges warrant the discipline imposed, the "discipline 
imposed for employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the Chief," so that the 
standard is abuse of discretion. Lucas, 949 P.2d at 761; accord, Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, 
f 22, 8 P.3d 1048. The Chief "exceeds the scope of his discretion if the punishment 
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imposed is in excess of 'the range of sanctions permitted by statute or regulation, or if, in 
light of all the circumstances, the punishment is disproportionate to the offense." Lucas, 
949 P.2d at 761. The Commission may only affirm or reverse sanctions imposed by the 
Chief. Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, % 23, 8 P.3d 1048. The appellate court reviews "the 
sanction in light of all the circumstances underlying the termination." Id. at f^ 24. 
6. Issue: Did the procedure at the August 13-15, 2001, hearing violate Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1012(2) or Huemiller's right to due process? 
Standard of Review: Whether a petitioner has been afforded due process 
during hearings is a question of law. Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste 
Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Preservation of Issue: Huemiller raised this issue in a Motion filed with 
the Commission (R. 50-59), and during the hearing before the Commission (R. 2549-50). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment XIV. 
2. Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 7. 
STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Copies of the statutes and rules of central importance to this appeal are attached as 
Exhibit A of the Addendum to this Brief ("OCPD Adden."). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
In February of 2000, OCPD received a complaint from Jeff Wangsgard, operator 
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of Ron's Auto Body in Ogden, that OCPD officers Huemiller, Ron VanBeekum and 
Kelly Zaugg were involved in "directing"1 vehicle tows to Ogden Auto Body ("OAB"). 
R. 2786, 2863-64. Huemiller was a Sergeant at that time, and outranked both Zaugg and 
VanBeekum. Based on this complaint, OCPD conducted an Internal Affairs investigation 
("IA") under the direction of Lt. Randy Watt. R. 2786. Lt. John Stubbs, assisted in the 
investigation. R. 2774. One of the issues in the IA was the undisputed fact that OAB had 
given cellphones to all three officers. R. 338. These three officers allegedly used their 
OAB cellphones (instead of their OCPD cellphones) to call OAB directly, thus 
circumventing Wrecker Dispatch and evading detection because the calls would not show 
up on OCPD's cellphone records.2 
At the conclusion of the I A, Lt. Watt compiled documents and interview 
transcripts, and prepared Findings and Recommendations, which he sent to Asst. Chief 
Marlin Balls ("Chief Balls") for review. R. 337-340, 3397. Chief Balls spent "a couple 
of weeks reviewing" the materials, and then recommended to Chief Greiner that Zaugg, 
VanBeekum and Huemiller be terminated. R. 3397-98. After receiving Chief Balls' 
recommendation, Chief Greiner spent two to three weeks reviewing the materials and 
reading transcripts of witness interviews. R. 2846-48, 3398. After reviewing the 
materials, Chief Greiner sent a letter to Huemiller on April 25, 2000, enclosing Lt. Watt's 
1
 "Directing" tows to OAB refers to: (1) calling OAB directly to request a wrecker 
instead of going through Wrecker Dispatch; (2) "suggesting" either directly or subtly that 
the owner of a vehicle damaged in an accident use OAB as the tow company; (3) 
converting a "no preference tow" to a "preference tow" to OAB. 
2In a 1996 investigation into alleged violations of the towing policy, conducted by 
Asst. Chief A.K. Greenwood ("Chief Greenwood"), OCPD cellphone records had been 
reviewed. See R. 319-336, at 330 & 332 (OCPD Ex. 2, Greenwood Report). 
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Findings and Recommendations and Chief Balls' recommendation, and notifying him to 
attend a scheduled predetermination hearing. R. 655-660, 3400. 
At the predetermination hearing on May 11, 2000, Chief Greiner met with 
Huemiller and his attorney, and informed them of the allegations and gave them the 
opportunity to tell Huemiller's side of the story, ask questions, and provide any 
explanations or say anything they wished to say. See R. 79-104, 3400. The hearing 
lasted nearly three hours, during which Chief Greiner provided Huemiller and his 
attorney with detailed information regarding allegations and evidence, including names, 
dates and relevant details. See id. Chief Greiner urged Huemiller to respond to this 
information and to explain his conduct. See id. He informed Huemiller that "you need to 
also understand that this is probably the last opportunity, or one of the last opportunities, 
you'll have to discuss this with me." R. 98. In response, Huemiller invoked his fifth 
amendment rights and refused to address specific issues or provide detailed explanations 
regarding the matters in question. Instead, he simply offered general and conclusory 
denials of any misconduct. R. 99-103. 
Chief Greiner spent the entire weekend after the predetermination hearing going 
over all the materials and listening to the tape of the hearing, including Huemiller's 
"limited testimony." R. 3408. On May 15, 2000, Chief Greiner sent Huemiller a letter 
notifying him that, based on the complaint, follow-up investigation, Chief Greiner's own 
investigation, and evidence adduced at the predetermination hearing, he found "the 
evidence of wrongdoing sustained." R. 35. The letter noted that "[t]he hearing was held 
to allow you the opportunity to provide to the hearing officer any explanation, evidence 
or information you deemed relevant and important bearing on these allegations prior to a 
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determination of any discipline." Id. 
Based on the IA and the officers' separate predetermination hearings, OCPD 
terminated Huemiller, Zaugg and VanBeekum. R. 3408-09. On May 19, 2000, 
Huemiller filed a Grievance and Appeal with the Commission, which stated: 
I have been charged with improperly sending tow business to Ogden Auto 
Body, misrepresentation, insubordination, conflict of interest, violation of 
department policies and unbecoming conduct. I deny all of these charges. 
At all times I have acted in an appropriate and professional manner, 
cooperated with the investigation, and have not used my position to direct 
business to Ogden Auto Body, or any other business. 
R. 1-2, at 2. 
Prior to the hearing before the Commission, OCPD provided Huemiller with over 
1200 pages of documents (including the IA files, responses to Huemiller's two sets of 
document requests, transcripts of officer interviews, police reports, and Huemiller's 
cellphone records), detailed answers to Huemiller's interrogatories, and it also permitted 
Huemiller's counsel to review and copy unredacted disciplinary files of other officers 
disciplined by Chief Greiner. See Resp. to Aplt.'s Facts, f 38, infra. 
On August 13-15, 2001, the Commission held a hearing on Huemiller's appeal, 
which lasted from about 9 a.m. until 9 p.m. each day. See R. 2527-3501, 3502-3648. 
Opening and closing statements were made and twenty witnesses were called, with 
Huemiller calling twelve witnesses and OCPD calling eight. Attorneys for both sides 
examined witnesses, and Commissioners asked questions of witnesses. Nearly one-
hundred exhibits (about 1200 pages) were admitted into evidence. R. 318-677, 681-1558. 
Both sides also issued witness subpoenas for the hearing, signed by the 
Commission. Certain witnesses subpoenaed by OCPD, however, refused to appear and 
7 
testify, including Tom Baur, an owner of OAB and close friend of Huemiller's, who 
invoked his fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination (see OCPD Fact 70), and 
Vanbeekum and Zaugg.3 R. 313; see also R. 3155-56. OCPD complied with Huemiller's 
requests and produced every employee for the hearing that it was asked to produce. 
On November 20, 2001, the Commission issued its Decision affirming Chief 
Greiner's termination of Huemiller's employment with Ogden City. R. 1551-63. 
Huemiller timely filed a Writ for Review on December 10, 2001. 
II. RESPONSE TO HUEMILLER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1-6. No dispute. 
7. This Fact incorrectly implies Huemiller rarely worked traffic accidents. 
Huemiller himself admitted at the hearing that when he worked the graveyard shift as a 
Sergeant and a Patrol Officer in the Uniform Division, he handled traffic accidents 
because officers who typically work traffic do not work the graveyard shift. R. 3003-05. 
In addition, Officer B.J. Mills testified that while on the Strike Force, Huemiller worked 
overtime in uniform as an officer and showed up at accidents. R. 2730. Lt. Stubbs 
testified that while on the Strike Force, Huemiller worked overtime in uniform and would 
have come in contact with accidents at that time. R. 3619. Huemiller also admitted that 
he visited accident scenes as a Sergeant and sometimes did not "sign out" as being there. 
R. 3005-06. Lt. Stubbs also testified that, since Huemiller was a Sergeant and did not 
have to "call out" at the scene of an accident, the background material used by 
Huemiller's witness Christina Ortega to compile a list of accidents where Huemiller was 
3The Commission can issue witness subpoenas but there is no statutory authority 
or other means to enforce them. 
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in attendance would actually "represent only a mere fraction of the accidents he would 
normally go to over the course of a year." R. 2832. 
8. Although it is not disputed that Huemiller received awards and 
commendations, he was also the most disciplined officer in the OCPD. R. 3372-73. See 
OCPD Fact 2. Before his termination, he had been disciplined eight separate times, 
including twice for credibility reasons, i.e., overstating hours on his time card (OCPD Ex. 
61, R. 665), and failing to include in his report that another officer slapped a suspect 
(OCPD Ex. 64, R. 668). OCPD Fact 2. 
9. This Fact does not tell the whole story, since Huemiller was also involved 
in handling traffic accidents when he was on the Strike Force. See ^ 7, supra. 
10. It is misleading to state that "OCPD used" private companies to tow 
vehicles disabled in accidents. Officers were to ask the driver of the vehicle if he/she had 
a preference for a towing company. The officer was then supposed to call Wrecker 
Dispatch which would contact the towing company designated by the driver if the driver 
had expressed a preference, or it would dispatch the next towing company on the rotation 
list if the driver had expressed no preference. See OCPD Facts 27, 37-44, 92, 95. 
11. Disputed. This statement is similar to Huemiller's parsing of language at 
the hearing, which the Decision criticized (see R. 1559-60) and which contributed to the 
Commission's finding that "Huemiller was not a credible witness" (R. 1559). Huemiller 
admitted to Lt. Stubbs that he knew the procedure. OCPD Fact 45. The Commission also 
found there was a policy which had repeatedly been emphasized, and that Huemiller 
violated it. R. 1560-61. Numerous witnesses at the hearing also testified there was a 
towing policy, and that everyone including Huemiller, knew what it was. OCPD Facts 37-
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45. Even John Valdez, Huemiller's witness, admitted knowing there was a procedure for 
handling tows. OCPD Fact 42. 
12. This Fact demonstrates the existence of a towing policy. This fact 
incorrectly implies that Huemiller was not informed of the towing the policy. To the 
contrary, the existence of the policy was universally recognized and was part of the FTO 
(Field Training Officer) program in which Huemiller participated. OCPD Facts 27-28, 
43; see also, f 11, supra. In fact, Huemiller admitted to Lt. Stubbs that he knew what 
should not be done in towing situations. OCPD Fact 45. 
13. Not disputed. 
14. Huemiller's statement that the Greenwood Memo "expired once it had 
been complied with" is an example of his "parsing" words at the hearing, which the 
Decision criticized (R. 1559-60) and which contributed to the Commission's finding that 
"Huemiller was not a credible witness" (R. 1559). It is also disingenuous to contend that 
a "procedure" that everyone is to follow will "expire once it had been complied with." 
Compliance with this policy is not a one-time event. Indeed, the policy is never fully 
complied with until it has been complied with by every officer in every subsequent 
circumstance where the policy might apply. Moreover, the evidence established that all 
officers, including Huemiller, knew what it was. See OCPD Facts 37-45, 95, 99; ffl[ 11-
12, supra. 
15. This Fact misstates the record. Chief Greiner, who is a member of the 
Executive Board of the Strike Force, testified that the Strike Force's policy was that 
vehicles were not to be seized based only on paraphernalia. OCPD Fact 78. No drugs or 
paraphernalia were found in the vehicle involved in the 29th & Madison incident. OCPD 
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Fact 72. A vehicle is seized "for being a conveyance in transporting of drugs." R. 3387 
(Greiner Testimony). Chief Greiner also testified that even if drugs are found in a 
vehicle, it cannot be forfeited unless it is being driven by the registered owner or the 
owner admits to allowing drugs to be transported, which was not the case in the 29th & 
Madison incident. R. 3384-88. 
16. Not disputed. 
17. Disputed. The record shows that OCPD officers, including Huemiller, 
knew the procedure for tows. ^ 11-12, supra. 
18. This misstates the record and fails to marshal the relevant record, i.e., (a) 
even when he was in the Strike Force, Huemiller worked for OCPD on accidents; (b) 
Huemiller admitted knowing OCPD towing procedure; and (c) Chief Greiner testified that 
the Strike Force cannot seize vehicles if only paraphernalia is found in the vehicle. 
OCPD Facts 44-45, 78, 90-91; see also ffif 7, 11-12, 15 supra. 
19. This Fact misstates the record when it alleges there was "intercompany 
warfare." The reality is that towing company complaints were about OCPD officers 
improperly directing tows, which resulted in an unfair allocation of tows. OCPD Facts 
25-27, 29, 31, 33. Moreover, Tom Baur is also an owner of OAB, and Huemiller admits 
he had plans to work with Tom at OAB after Tom's father, Clair, retired. OCPD Fact 3. 
20. This Fact overstates the record and the focus of the I A, when it contends 
Chief Empey "apparently did nothing about the complaint." 
21-22. Not disputed. 
23. Disputed. Chris Shaw, attorney for the Towing Association, complained 
that OCPD officers were sending tows to OAB, not Brett's Towing. OCPD Fact 31. 
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24-26. The term "merely took notes" is overreaching and not substantiated. 
27-30. Not disputed. However, this is not the complete story and again reflects 
Huemiller's credibility problems. See OCPD Facts 92-102. 
31-32. Not disputed. 
33. Not disputed, although this Fact fails to provide the entire record before the 
Commission, i.e., (a) Huemiller continued to work for OCPD when he was in the Strike 
Force; (b) Huemiller admitted knowing OCPD towing procedure; and (c) Chief Greiner 
testified that the Strike Force cannot seize vehicles if only paraphernalia is found in the 
vehicle. See n. 18, infra.; see also fflf 7, 11-12, 15 supra. 
34-35. Not disputed. 
36-38. These Facts are misleading and fail to tell the entire story. The Lt. Watts' 
IA report provides the allegations against Huemiller. R. 337-40. At the three-hour 
predetermination hearing Chief Greiner provided Huemiller and his attorney with details, 
names, and allegations, and gave Huemiller the opportunity to make any comments or ask 
any questions he might like. R. 79-104. Huemiller chose to say little more than that he 
denied everything. See id. Further, every document in the investigative notebook was 
provided to Huemiller months before the hearing. In fact, prior to the hearing before the 
Commission, OCPD provided Huemiller with over 1200 pages of documents. OCPD first 
provided over 400 pages to Huemiller, comprising the IA files regarding Huemiller, 
VanBeekum, and Zaugg, including interview summaries, police reports, and witness 
statements. See R. 63. OCPD also produced hundreds of pages of documents in response 
to Huemiller's two sets of document requests, and it also provided twenty-seven pages of 
responses to the seventeen Interrogatories in Huemiller's First Set of Interrogatories. See 
12 
R. 125-152. OCPD's Interrogatory responses gave explicit details of the evidence against 
Huemiller as well as the reasons for Chief Greiner's decision to terminate Huemiller's 
employment. See id. In compliance with Huemiller's request and the Commission's 
Order, OCPD also permitted Huemiller's counsel to review the unredacted disciplinary 
files of other officers disciplined by Chief Greiner. SeeR. 158-178, 188, 190-95,3409-
3411; see also OCPD Adden. Ex. B (July 17, 2001 Letter to Lauren Scholnick from 
Judith Wolferts), Ex. C (April 25, 2001 Letter to Erik Strindberg from Camille Johnson) 
and Ex. D (Feb. 27, 2001 List of Disciplined Employees), and R. 155 (Letter from Police 
Association Requesting Confidentiality of Discipline Files). Huemiller's attorneys 
identified which disciplinary files they wished to have copied. See Ex. B, OCPD Adden. 
Prior to the hearing, OCPD also provided Huemiller with transcripts of officer interviews 
taken during the I A, certain police reports requested by Huemiller, and Huemiller's 
cellphone records obtained for the IA. 
39. This Fact fails to provide the entire story. At the predetermination hearing, 
Chief Greiner informed Huemiller in great detail of the allegations against him, but 
Huemiller refused to respond except with general denials. See R. 79-104. Huemiller's 
"Garrity warning" excuse for not responding is without merit, since Garrity covers only 
persons making "incriminating" statements. See Garrity v. State ofNJ., 385 U.S. 493 
(1967). If Huemiller is to be believed, any answer or response he would have made to 
deny allegations would have been truthful, and therefore not incriminating. The reality is 
that Huemiller's failure to respond at the predetermination hearing because he did not 
want to incriminate himself amounted to a virtual admission that the allegations against 
him were true. 
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40-41. Not disputed. However, the process afforded Huemiller in the evidentiary 
hearing did not violate due process, as discussed below. 
42- 43. Not disputed, although Huemiller was not required to "disprove the 
charges against him" at the hearing. Moreover, the Commission's Rule requiring him to 
establish the grounds on which he relied to disprove the "action taken by the appointing 
authority" is consistent with Utah case law, and does not violate due process, as discussed 
below. 
44-46. Not disputed. 
47. Disputed. The Commission's Decision is clear, appropriate, and based on 
the evidence and exhibits presented at the hearing. Compare Commission's Decision (R. 
1557-63) with Hrg. Trans. (R. 2727- 3501) with OCPD's Facts, infra. The Commission 
also found that Huemiller "misrepresented the truth" (R. 1558) and that he was not a 
credible witness (R. 1559). The Decision is based on the witnesses' testimony, the 
exhibits, and on Huemiller's own demeanor and lack of credibility. The issue of the 
"appropriateness of the penalty" was, of course, a necessary predicate to the 
Commission's conclusion to affirm Huemiller's termination. R. 1563. 
48. Not disputed. 
49-51. These alleged Facts are incomplete, are argumentative, do not reflect the 
entire record, and are similar to Huemiller's parsing of language at the hearing, which the 
Commission criticized. For example, they completely ignore the testimony of Chief 
Greenwood wherein he explained in detail what was discussed in his interview with 
Huemiller, as well as the statements and testimony of many other witnesses who 
confirmed that Huemiller violated towing policy. See e.g., OCPD Facts 27-28, 30, 37-45, 
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48,49,61,66,68,71. 
52. These alleged Facts are incomplete, are argumentative, do not reflect the 
entire record, and are similar to Huemiller's parsing of language at the hearing. For 
example, Mills testified that Huemiller was already talking on the cellphone when the 
suspect was still being searched, and Mills had not told Huemiller about the search. R. 
2713, 2722. Mills also testified that when he heard Huemiller making the call, he did not 
think it was an appropriate drug seizure. R. 2715. The additional relevant facts regarding 
the 29th & Madison incident are set forth below. See OCPD Facts 72-78. 
53-54. These alleged Facts are incomplete, are argumentative, do not reflect the 
entire record, and are similar to Huemiller's parsing of language at the hearing. For 
example, they ignore the statements and testimony of many other witnesses who 
confirmed that Huemiller violated towing policy, as well as the evidence regarding the SR 
79 accident, and Huemiller's own DMV records which showed his lack of credibility 
about the Geo Tracker. See OCPD Facts 57-61, 64, 66, 68, 71; n. 18, infra. 
55. This alleged Fact does not reflect the entire record before the Commission, 
does not marshal the evidence, and is reflective of Huemiller's parsing of language. This 
Fact also fails to include the evidence that Huemiller was angry when he telephoned 
McGregor and that he called McGregor a "fucking rat," and said "you turned on me." 
OCPD Facts 128-29. 
56. This alleged Fact misstates the record and is incomplete. Sgt. Spence 
Phillips did not receive free auto work. He had OAB do some insurance-paid paint repair 
after an accident, turned the insurance check over to OAB, and Tom Baur told him the 
insurance had covered everything. R. 373-74 (Stubbs' Supp. Rep.). Furthermore, 
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Phillips did not try to influence citizens to use one wrecker company but instead gave 
them the names of unrelated wreckers. R. 1543. The only time Phillips used OAB 
without calling dispatch was "to clear up a severely messed up intersection when time and 
congestion were factors/' and OAB was already on the scene. R. 373. 
57. This alleged Fact misstates the record and is incomplete. Unlike Huemiller, 
Mills did not direct tows to OAB, and allowed OAB to take a vehicle only once without 
going through Wrecker Dispatch in a situation where an accident was blocking the 
intersection and OAB was already there on a drug seizure. R. 1531-32. Mills also tried 
to give OAB money for the oil change but they refused to take it, and he had paid for all 
prior work on his vehicle. R. 1539. 
58. This alleged Fact misstates the record and is incomplete. Lucero never 
directed tows, and after OAB had installed a used radiator and fixed the brakes on his car 
and did not send him a bill, he visited OAB twice to pay for the work but OAB refused 
payment. R. 373-74 (Stubbs' Supp. Rep.). 
59. This alleged Fact misstates the record and is incomplete. Felter never 
directed tows to OAB and Felter did receive some discipline, as Huemiller himself 
concedes in his brief by acknowledging that Felter received a Letter of Caution which 
states that his "actions 'present[] an image of the department that is not consistent with 
the image we wish to project to the public and has allowed for criticism of the department 
. . . . ' " See Aplt's Brf., pp. 25-26 (quoting Letter of Caution). 
60. This alleged Fact misstates the record and is incomplete. Not only does 
Huemiller admit Weloth was disciplined, the evidence showed that: (a) Weloth worked 
for Sears Automotive, Midas Muffler, and Hinckley Dodge, and his "relationship" with 
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OAB was via those avenues; (b) he only recommended OAB to personal friends; and (c) 
he bought and paid for wrecked motorcycles from OAB, and then fixed them up and 
sold them with none of the proceeds going to OAB. R. 379. 
61. This alleged Fact misstates the record and is incomplete. It ignores the 
following additional facts which are part of the record. Officer Danielle Croyle testified 
that in about February-March, 1997, she went to OAB seeking to purchase a car. R. 
3223. Tom Baur told her that "Tony was driving a Nissan Ultima, that he was selling it 
for him, that I could go test drive that one." R. 3223-24. Croyle went to Huemiller5s 
house to pick up the Nissan and test drive it. R. 3224. Kelli Huemiller was at home when 
Croyle arrived, and Kelli was upset that Croyle was taking it because "it was the car that 
they were driving." R. 3226. The Nissan had been hail-damaged and OAB had repaired 
it and Tom Baur told Croyle that OAB would sell it for $10,000. R. 3224. Croyle spent 
two weeks trying to arrange the purchase and getting the run around, and when she went 
to Allstate Insurance to pay for the vehicle, Allstate told her the price was $15,000 and 
they thought the vehicle had been on OAB's lot and did not know it was being driven 
around. R. 3225-27. She gave Allstate the keys and walked away. R. 3227. 
62. This alleged Fact is incomplete. The information regarding Officer 
Greenhalgh was very limited and provides no basis for comparison with Huemiller. 
63. This alleged Fact misstates the record and is incomplete. There is no 
evidence that the officer at issue ever directed tows to OAB, and it is undisputed that he 
was disciplined. SeeR. 2889-90. 
64. This alleged Fact misstates the record and is incomplete. None of the 
officers at issue ever directed tows, and none lied in an IA. In fact, Chief Greiner testified 
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that he had terminated three to four officers for lying in an IA. OCPD Fact 131. 
Furthermore, with regard to | (a) the officer was later allowed to resign in lieu of 
termination when he was caught driving an OAB vehicle. See n. 13, infra. Concerning f 
(b), the officers worked at a concert in Spanish Fork on one occasion, and they did not lie 
about it. R. 1446-47 (Aplt Ex. 39). Concerning f^ (c), the officer who lied to the park 
ranger did it off duty, and he admitted his lie during the IA. R. 1455-57 (Aplt. Ex. 40). 
Concerning ^ (d), Chief Greiner testified that Huemiller was the "standard" for setting the 
discipline for the officers involved in a bar fight since Huemiller had received the same 
discipline when he was previously involved in a bar fight. R. 3421. Concerning f^ (e), the 
officer at issue never directed tows, and never lied about what he was doing. Finally, 
VanBeekum and Zaugg were terminated for conduct similar to Huemiller's, they held a 
lower rank than Huemiller, who was a Sergeant, and they admitted their misconduct 
during the IA, unlike Huemiller, who lied. OCPD Facts 12-14, 16; R. 3408-09. 
III. OCPD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS AND MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE 
To challenge the Commission's factual findings on appeal, Huemiller must 
marshal all evidence supporting the findings. Whitear v. Labor Comm 'n, 973 P.2d 982, 
984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Huemiller has failed to comply with this requirement and, 
instead, has misrepresented the record and completely ignored a substantial body of 
evidence which supports the Commission's findings. Thus, Huemiller's fact statement 
offers a very distorted view of the record. Indeed, some of the most critical evidence 
below has not even been mentioned, let alone addressed, by Huemiller. As a result, 
OCPD has been forced to marshal the relevant evidence in its Statement of Facts. The 
following is the rest of the story heard by the Commission. 
18 
A. HUEMILLER'S BACKGROUND 
1. Huemiller joined OCPD in 1983. R. 2938. His first assignment was the 
Uniform Division, which lasted about five years and where he handled traffic accidents 
when there was "overflow." R. 2939. He also spent several years in the Strike Force, 
which is responsible for investigating narcotics trafficking and drug offenses in Weber 
and Morgan County. R. 2942. He became a Sergeant in 1996 (R. 2945), and was a 
Sergeant when he was suspended March 7, 2000 (R. 2948). 
2. Huemiller admitted that during his tenure as a police officer he was 
disciplined by OCPD for: (a) failing to show up for two court appearances and being late 
for two others (OCPD Ex. 57, R. 661); (b) allowing a civilian to ride in a police car 
(OCPD Ex. 58, R. 662); (c) violating police pursuit driving policy and endangering 
himself and his police car (OCPD Ex. 59, R. 663); (d) striking a suspect in the head with 
his police pistol and then failing to include this fact in his police report (OCPD Ex. 60, R. 
664); (e) overstating his work hours on his time card (OCPD Ex. 61, R. 665); (f) speeding 
in a police vehicle (OCPD Ex. 62, R. 666); (g) fighting in public with another police 
officer (OCPD Ex. 63, R. 667); and (h) failing to report that another police officer had 
slapped a suspect (OCPD Ex. 64, R. 668). See R. 3013-16 (Huemiller testimony).4 
B. BENEFITS HUEMILLER RECEIVED FROM OAB 
OAB TRIP 
3. Huemiller and Tom Baur are close, long-time friends. R. 2971. Huemiller 
admitted he went to Laguna Seca, a race track in Monterey California, with Tom Baur in 
4Tim Allen, a parole officer and friend of Huemiller, testified that as a police 
officer, Huemiller "liked to live on the edge." R. 2599. 
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about 1993 on a trip that was paid for by Phister's Paint & Glass ("PPG"), which sells 
auto paint to dealers. R. 2985-86. He admitted he got the trip because "I knew I wasn't 
always going to be a cop and I wanted to move into something else, and at that time I 
thought of the option of maybe working with Tom after his dad [Clair] maybe retired 
from the job Tom would need someone else to help out with the work." R. 2986. 
OAB VEHICLES 
4. Huemiller admitted he has driven OAB vehicles on dealer plates. R. 2983. 
Huemiller testified that he has purchased vehicles from OAB, and that OAB had first 
obtained those as crashed vehicles and then repaired and sold them. R. 2977-78 
5. Huemiller testified that while he was a police officer he sold OAB cars and 
received a finders fee from OAB. R. 2990-93. 
6. Officer Croyle testified that in about February-March, 1997, she went to 
OAB seeking to purchase a car. R. 3223. Tom Baur told her that "Tony was driving a 
Nissan Ultima, that he was selling it for him, that I could go test drive that one." R. 3223-
24. Croyle went to Huemiller's house to pick up the Nissan and test drive it. R. 3224. 
Kelli Huemiller was at home when Croyle arrived, and Kelli was upset that Croyle was 
taking it because "it was the car that they were driving." R. 3226. 
7. In his opening statement, Huemiller's attorney told the Commission that 
every vehicle that Huemiller and his wife ever owned was "registered just like you're 
supposed to." R. 2561. During the hearing, Huemiller's attorney then placed into 
evidence a list from the Utah Division of Motor Vehicles of all vehicles registered to 
Huemiller and his wife during the relevant time period (the "DMV List"). See R. 1401-
1410 (Aplt's Ex. 31). Huemiller testified that this was a list of all vehicles owned by the 
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Huemillers. R. 2975. 
8. Huemiller's attorney explained to the Commission that the purpose of 
entering the DMV List into evidence was as follows: 
The accusations are that Tony somehow got special deals from Ogden Auto 
Body on vehicles or was driving vehicles that he got from Ogden Auto 
Body on dealer plates, so I'm trying to show that he neither got deals nor 
did he get any kind of special favors, in other words, that he wasn't given a 
vehicle with dealer plates on it to drive for months on end, which is the type 
of allegation that has been made. 
R. 2984. 
9. Both Huemiller and his wife testified that they had owned a Geo Tracker, 
which they claimed they purchased from OAB, and that this Geo Tracker was on the 
DMV List, evidencing that they had registered this vehicle. R. 2911-12, 2975-77. Kelli 
Huemiller testified the Huemillers owned the GEO Tracker "for awhile," and drove it for 
a couple of months before they sold it. R. 2916-17. 
10. The DMV List, however, established that Huemiller lied about the Geo 
Tracker, because it shows the Huemillers never registered a Geo Tracker. See R. 1401-
1410; R. 1402-1411 (Aplt's Ex. 31). On cross-examination, Huemiller admitted that the 
vehicle on the DMV List that he had testified was the Geo Tracker was, in reality, a 
Baretta he had owned and that the Geo Tracker was not registered. R. 3071-72. 
11. Former officer Keith Brady testified at the hearing that Huemiller got good 
deals on vehicles from Tom Baur; that Tom got a wrecked Geo Tracker, and Huemiller 
fixed it up and sold it for "a good price." R. 3137-38, 640-41. Brady testified that 
Huemiller had the Tracker for about six months to a year before he sold it, and that he did 
not pay OAB for the Tracker until after he sold it. R. 641-42; 3138-39. 
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OAB CELLPHONE 
12. Zaugg told Lt. Stubbs in his Garrity interview that he received the OAB 
cellphone in the summer of 1999, and that he used it to call OAB on tows. R. 439-41. 
Zaugg told Lt. Stubbs that Tom Baur told him when he gave it to him just to "go ahead 
and use the phone/5 but Zaugg said that "I'm sure he was implying that I could call him 
for tows using that, I'm sure of that" and Zaugg admitted that the reason he got the 
cellphone from Tom Baur was to call OAB wreckers. R. 440, 445. 
13. Zaugg admitted to Lt. Stubbs that he had written down OAB as a preference 
tow on accident reports when it actually was a no preference tow. R. 443. He did this so 
it couldn't be tracked and would not look suspicious. R. 444-45. Zaugg said that if he 
"could send something [Tom's] way, he would." R. 446. 
14. In exchange for sending tows to OAB, Zaugg drove OAB vehicles without 
paying for them, registering them, or licensing them. R. 447. Zaugg admitted to Lt. 
Stubbs that he would not have received these things if it had not been sending tows to 
OAB. R. 449-50. 
15. Zaugg told Lt. Stubbs that he returned the cellphone to OAB just before the 
Garrity interview. R. 440. Zaugg told Lt. Stubbs "I knew the department wouldn't 
approve of it. I knew I wasn't going to talk to anybody else about that phone." R. 440. 
16. VanBeekum told Lt. Stubbs in his Garrity interview that at first he would 
call OAB on his own cellphone and tell OAB he was going to an accident and to "cruise 
it," and then in about the summer of 1999, Tom Baur gave him an OAB cellphone. R. 
484 (VanBeekum Trans.). Vanbeekum told Lt. Stubbs that he did not pay the cellphone 
bill. R. 485. 
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17. Huemiller admitted that Zaugg, VanBeekum, and himself were each given a 
cellphone by OAB. R. 35665. Huemiller testified that he obtained this cellphone from 
OAB in early 2000. R. 2988. He already had a cellphone provided by the OCPD for 
work use. R. 2989. He testified that he needed the second phone because the OCPD 
cellphone had a limit on minutes used and he would have to pay for additional minutes. 
R. 2989. Huemiller testified that he could have obtained a personal use cellphone through 
OCPD, but instead got it through OAB because he was planning to buy a house and he 
did not want to get a personal cellphone through OCPD because he would have to fill out 
a credit application and he did not want it on his credit report. R. 2989-90.5 Chief 
Greiner testified that an OCPD officer, even one returning from service with the Strike 
Force, does not have to fill out a credit application to obtain a department phone for 
personal use. R. 3389. 
18. Huemiller did not pay for his OAB cellphone until after the investigation 
blew up, and then his wife went to Tom Baur and wrote him a check for $70 payable to 
"AT&T," even though Huemiller did not have an account with AT&T and the cellphone 
allegedly was on OAB's corporate plan. R. 2909, 2926. 
19. Kelli Huemiller testified that the OAB cellphone was for Huemiller. R. 
2924. By contrast, Huemiller testified that the OAB cellphone was for Kelli to use, and 
that he sometimes took it to work when he was on graveyard shift. R. 3560. 
5Kelli Huemiller testified that the reason Huemiller obtained a personal cellphone 
through OAB instead of through OCPD was because they were considering purchasing a 
house and they did not want "that debt to show on our credit [report]." R. 2905-06, 2928. 
Within five months of receiving the OAB cellphone, the Huemillers leased a Pathfinder 
for $300 per month, and Ms. Huemiller testified she was not concerned about that being 
on the credit report because "everybody needs a car." See R. 2929. 
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20. Huemiller testified at the hearing that he did not mind going over the 
minute limit on the OAB cellphone because "I didn't pay it." R. 3562. 
21. Huemiller testified that he told Lt. Stubbs that he "barely used" the OAB 
cellphone. R. 3569. The cellphone actually was used 159 times in about 50 days. See R. 
611-15 (OCPD Ex. 33 (Huemiller OAB cellphone records)). 
22. Huemiller testified that he used the OAB cellphone when he wanted to 
make long calls, i.e., "I wasn't worried about the time so I could sit and chat with Tom as 
long as I wanted to." R. 3049. Of Huemiller's calls to Tom Baur/OAB, only two are 4 
minutes, six are 3 minutes, five are 2 minutes, and the rest are 1 minute or less. See id. 
23. Huemiller's OAB cellphone records show that he called Tom Baur's 
cellphone number (791-7338) and OAB's phone number (399-1163) repeatedly. See id.; 
see also R. 3569-3571. Huemiller's OAB cellphone records show that he made 26 calls 
to Tom Baur in 50 days, most of them very short and in the late hours, including at 9:56 
p.m. (1/15/00); 12:37 a.m. (1/23/00); 12:28 a.m. (2/4/00); 3:51 a.m. (2/10/00); 12:33 a.m. 
(2/11/00); 1:54 a.m. (2/13/00); 11:43 p.m. (2/19/00); 3:44 a.m. (2/25/00).6 See R. 611-15. 
24. Huemiller's February 11, 2000, call to OAB regarding the 29th & Madison 
incident was made on his OAB cellphone. R. 3042-43. Huemiller testified that when he 
called Tom Baur that night, he just "grabbed whatever phone" was there. R. 3045. None 
of his calls to Tom Baur or OAB, however, were made from his OCPD cellphone. R. 
3046-49; R. 616-621 (OCPD Ex. 34 (Huemiller's OCPD cellphone records)). 
6Huemiller hedged on who was calling Tom Bauer on the OAB cellphone at late 
hours, stating "[i]t could have been anybody." See R. 3570-71, 3041-3045. 
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C. OCPD TOWING POLICY 
HISTORY OF TOWING POLICY AND INVESTIGATIONS 
25. Although the actual towing of vehicles involved in an accident is not itself 
particularly lucrative, it becomes lucrative because the vehicle's owner is likely to have 
the company that tows the car do any repairs. R. 2570. 
26. In order to be fair to the various towing companies, OCPD had a "rotation 
system55 for having officers "call" for a tow, which officers were required to follow. R. 
2570. Officers were supposed to ask vehicle drivers if they had a preference (a 
"preference" tow), and if they did, the officer was to call Wrecker Dispatch which would 
dispatch the wrecker requested. R. 2579. If a vehicle owner had no preference (a "no 
preference" tow), the officer was supposed to call Wrecker Dispatch and ask that a "no 
preference" wrecker be dispatched. R. 2579. Wrecker Dispatch would then call the next 
towing company on the list in the rotation, and in this way the no preference towing was 
supposed to be fairly divided. Id. 
27. OCPD has had a towing policy for many years. Two General Orders on 
towing had been issued by OCPD Chief L.A. Jacobsen, one in 1968 and a supplement in 
1969. See R. 655 (OCPD Ex. 44 (Gen. Ord. No. 61 on Wrecker Service, dated Feb. 28, 
1968)); R. 636 (OCPD Ex. 45 (Supp. to Gen. Ord. No. 61, dated Dec. 16, 1969)). 
28. In 1978, OCPD began a FTO program for the training of every OCPD 
officer. R. 2866. Chief Greiner testified that a decision was made by Chief Mike Empey 
that the towing policy was a training issue and that it would be included in the FTO 
program. R. 2896-97. One of the objectives in the FTO program is that every officer is 
trained in towing procedure. R. 2866-67. Chief Greiner testified he was the first OCPD 
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certified FTO? that he trained Lt. Watt, and that Lt. Watt trained Huemiller. R. 2898. 
29. Prior to Chief Greiner's tenure as police chief, the Towing Association had 
sometimes complained that an unfair proportion of tows were going to "one or the other 
of the Bauer brothers automotive services in the community." R. 2849. Clair Baur and 
his son Tom own OAB and its associated towing companies, and Clair's brother Gary 
Baur owns Brett's Towing and its associated companies. R. 2849-50. 
30. In 1995, Chief Greenwood sent a memorandum to officers reiterating that 
they were not to call a towing company directly even if it was a preference tow, and that 
all wreckers were to go through Wrecker Dispatch, including drug-related impounds. R. 
318 (OCPD Ex. 1 ("Greenwood Memo")). The Greenwood Memo was a reinforcement 
of existing policies and procedures. R. 2865, 2867-68 (Greiner Testimony). Chief 
Greenwood wrote the Greenwood Memo after a meeting with towing companies to 
discuss complaints that OCPD was not following established procedures, and to prohibit 
officers from calling wreckers directly. R. 3108. 
31. In 1996, Chris Shaw, the attorney for the Towing Association contacted the 
OCPD and alleged that some officers were showing favoritism and sending tows to OAB 
in violation of the policy. R. 2952-53. Chief Greiner responded by sending a 
memorandum to Chief Greenwood asking him to conduct an investigation into the 
allegation that OCPD officers were circumventing Wrecker Dispatch and calling OAB 
directly for tows, and were using OCPD cellphones to do so. R. 2852-53; see also R. 
1362 (Aplt's Ex. 24 (2/20/96 (Mem. to Greenwood)). 
32. Chief Greenwood conducted an investigation which included obtaining 
officers' OCPD cellphone records, including Huemiller's and VanBeekum's, to 
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determine whether they were calling wreckers directly. R. 330-31. As part of this 
investigation, Chief Greenwood interviewed Huemiller, as discussed in detail below. At 
the conclusion of his investigation, Chief Greenwood submitted a report to Chief Greiner. 
R. 319-336 (OCPD Ex. 2 ("Greenwood Report55)). 
33. In 1999, another complaint about officers sending tows to OAB was made 
by Jeff Wangsgaard, owner of Ron's Towing. R. 2862, 3185. In response to that 
complaint, Asst. Chief Marlin Balls7 sent a memorandum again reiterating the towing 
policy. R. 341 (OCPD Ex. 4 (Balls Memo)). The Balls Memo stated that: "the matter is 
under investigation and I hope I don't find anyone who is preferring OAB or influencing 
anyone to choose them.55 R. 341. Chief Balls conducted an investigation, and on May 7, 
1999, sent an e-mail to Sergeant Spence Phillips of the Traffic Division letting him know 
that he had better not "find anyone who is preferring OAB or influencing anyone to 
choose them.55 R. 3185-3186; see also R. 417. 
34. In early 2000, Wangsgaard again complained to OCPD about the number of 
tows going to OAB. R. 3185. Wangsgaard specifically named Zaugg, VanBeekum, and 
Huemiller as the officers violating policy. R. 2863-64. Chief Balls testified that the 2000 
investigation was prompted when Wangsgaard complained that he had just seen Zaugg 
hand a list of towing companies to vehicle owners who had been involved in an accident, 
and on the list the names of OAB and its affiliates were highlighted. R. 3188. He 
reported this to Chief Greiner. Id. 
35. Chief Balls testified that the investigation in 2000 was assigned to Lt. Watt, 
7Chief Balls worked for OCPD from 1965 until he retired in July of 2000, and was 
an Assistant Chief of Police at the time of his retirement. R. 3184-85. 
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who provided him with a report after the investigation was concluded. R. 3188-89; see 
also R. 337-340 (OCPD Ex. 3 (Watt IA Report)). Chief Balls reviewed the report and 
documentation, concluded that Zaugg, VanBeekum, and Huemiller should be terminated, 
and made that recommendation to Chief Greiner. R. 3190; see also R. 1397 (OCPD Ex. 
54 (Balls' Recommendation)). 
36. Chief Greiner testified that after receiving Chief Balls' recommendation 
that Huemiller, Zaugg and VanBeekum be terminated, he examined the evidence and 
concluded he needed to talk to the officers in predetermination hearings and get their 
versions. R. 3397-98. 
OFFICERS' UNIVERSAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TOWING POLICY 
37. Chief Greiner testified that during his twenty years at OCPD, the towing 
policy "has never changed from the time I hired on, that you never call for a wrecker 
without going through a dispatch center." R. 2896-97. He stated there had never been 
"confusion among the officers" about the fact that they should never call a wrecker 
directly. R. 2898-99. 
38. Chief Greenwood worked for OCPD from February 10, 1965 until June 13, 
1996, and testified that "[f]rom the time I went on the Ogden Police Department until I 
left, it was never the Officer's discretion to call a towing company." R. 3105-07. 
39. Chief Balls testified that it was inappropriate for an officer to call a towing 
company directly, and that officers should call Wrecker Dispatch and ask for a no-
preference tow, i.e., the next wrecker in the rotation. R. 3187. 
40. At the hearing, Patrolman Scott McGregor agreed with Chief Greiner's 
description of the towing procedure. R. 2639. 
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41. Mills testified at the hearing that it violates policy to call a towing company 
directly, that tows are supposed to go through Wrecker Dispatch, and that he understood 
that this was the procedure to be followed. R. 2716, 2732. 
42. John Valdez, a former OCPD officer who retired in 1997 and the Labor 
Representative for the Ogden Police Benefit Association, testified that OCPD has had a 
long-time procedure on towing that all tows are to go through Wrecker Dispatch. R. 
2736-37, 2754, 2758. He testified that: (a) the entire time he was in OCPD he understood 
it was not appropriate to call a towing company directly (R. 2772); (b) the procedure was 
in force when he was hired by OCPD in 1973 (R. 2737, 2765-66); (c) the policy was the 
same when he resigned as an OCPD officer in 1997 (R. 2766-67). 
43. Lt. Stubbs testified that the towing policy and procedure was "very well 
understood, it was being taught in the FTO program, it had been investigated back in 
1996, there was written procedure that came out, if a departmental order or procedure 
comes out in writing, it's a law, and this does not need to be in a policy manual, and if 
you violate it, you violated it the same as violating policy." R. 2834. 
44. Huemiller admitted in the hearing that he was aware of the Greenwood 
Memo (R. 3016-17), and that he knew he was required to follow the procedures given in 
the Greenwood Memo. (R. 3019); see also R. 318. He also admitted it was policy to call 
dispatch so that proper documentation could be made. R. 3018. 
HUEMILLER >S EVASIVENESS REGARDING THE TOWING POLICY 
45. During his IA interview, Huemiller told Lt. Stubbs that "to my knowledge 
there is no policy on requesting tows, so out of policy is a broad thing." R. 3037. In 
response to Lt. Stubbs5 pressing the issue, Huemiller said "I think there was something 
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that came out that said we would not circumvent Wrecker Dispatch." R. 3038. 
During the interview, Huemiller finally admitted that he had previously gone through an 
internal investigation regarding the towing policy and that he knew it was against policy 
to circumvent Wrecker Dispatch. R. 3038. 
46. During the hearing, Huemiller's position to the Commission was that since 
there was no towing "policy" in the Policy Manual, he could not be responsible to comply 
with a "policy."8 See Hearing Trans., passim (e.g., 2866-68). 
47. When Huemiller was asked in the hearing whether he had disclosed to 
Chief Greenwood during the 1996 investigation that he had violated the policy, he said 
that the Greenwood Memo "is not a policy." R. 3023-24. 
48. When Huemiller was asked at the hearing whether he had ever called "OAB 
or any other wrecker unless a citizen requested [it]," he said that he could not answer that 
question because he did not know. R. 3025. 
49. Although Huemiller parsed words and failed to answer directly during the 
hearing, his testimony shows that before the Greenwood investigation, he had called OAB 
even though the vehicle owner had not requested it. See R. 3026-27. 
50. At the hearing, Huemiller tried to evade the issue of whether he knew the 
towing procedure by stating: that, "at this time" he could not remember whether he was 
trained on it during field training, whether there was a policy or procedure, or whether he 
was "trained at all" on towing procedure; and that "to his recollection" he never "wrote 
down" OAB when it was a no-preference tow. R. 3006-09. 
8Huemiller's attorney suggested to the Commission that because the Greenwood 
Memo was in writing, it had expired after it "was complied with." See R. 2868-69. 
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D. EVIDENCE THAT HUEMILLER VIOLATED THE TOWING 
POLICY 
STATEMENTS AND TESTIMONY OF OFFICERS AND WITNESSES 
Lt. Stubbs' Witness Interviews And Statements 
51. Lt. Stubbs, a twenty-year veteran and the Commander of the Detective 
Major Case Bureau, was brought into the investigation by Lt. Randy Watt.9 R. 3246. 
52. Lt. Stubbs testified that he conducted interviews of police officers and 
others during the investigation. R. 2774. Some of the interviews of police officers were 
conducted under "Garrity."10 When an officer is interviewed under "Garrity," the officer 
is informed that this is an internal investigation, that answers must be truthful, and that 
answers given cannot be used against the officer in a criminal proceeding. R. 2779. 
53. The signed Garrity Warnings of Chris McAllister, Kelly Zaugg, Doug 
Lucero, Scott McGregor, Tony Huemiller, and Ron VanBeekum were admitted into 
evidence at the hearing. See R. 648-53 (City's Exs. 48-53). 
54. As part of the IA in 2000, Lt. Stubbs conducted approximately fifteen 
interviews of thirteen police officers, compared spread sheets showing accidents reports 
with the towing company that had towed the damaged vehicle(s), and reviewed 
cell phone records and Wrecker Dispatch logs. R. 2788-89. 
55. Lt. Stubbs' approach was to assume the officer under investigation had 
done nothing wrong, and his goal was to exonerate the officer. R. 2782-83. Lt. Stubbs 
9Lt. Stubbs had a personal conversation with Chief Greiner about the investigation, 
and was told to go wherever he needed to go with the investigation. R. 3248. 
10This concept derives from Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
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testified that, because there was also a criminal investigation by Weber County going on 
concerning OAB at the time, he isolated himself from anything that might be the subject 
of the criminal investigation and focused only on the internal investigation. R. 2791-92. 
He testified at the hearing that he found "incriminating leads" which "had I been allowed 
to follow them, they would have been nails in the coffin." R. 2792. 
56. At the conclusion of the interviews, Lt. Stubbs prepared a report. R. 2796, 
3247; see also R. 373-386 (OCPD Ex. 7 (Stubbs' Supp. Rep.)). 
57. Lt. Stubbs5 first task was to re-interview Zaugg, who had been interviewed 
once, and to follow any leads generated by that interview. R. 2787. During his interview 
with Lt. Stubbs, Zaugg admitted directing tows to OAB, and said that Huemiller also 
directed tows to OAB.11 R. 435-474, at 450-51 (OCPD Ex. 15 (Zaugg Trans.)); see also 
R. 2842, 3255-56, 3258 (Hrg. Trans.). 
58. During his interview with Lt. Stubbs, Officer Doug Lucero told Stubbs that 
after 1997, Huemiller had approached him and told him that he would appreciate anything 
that Lucero could do to increase tows to OAB versus Brett's towing. R. 3249; see also R. 
391-405 (OCPD Ex. 9 (Lucero Trans.)). 
59. During his interview with Lt. Stubbs, VanBeekum admitted directing tows 
to OAB,12 and said that Huemiller also sent tows to OAB. R. 478-521, at 479-80, 506. 
(OCPD Ex. 18 (Vanbeekum Trans.)); see also R. 2842, 3275 (Hrg. Trans). 
1
 during his interview with Lt. Stubbs, Huemiller said that Zaugg and VanBeekum 
were calling OAB directly. R. 3038; see also R. 524-545, at 543. 
12VanBeekum told Lt. Stubbs that he would sometimes recommend that a no-
preference owner use OAB, and other times he simply called OAB without even asking. 
R. 494. 
32 
60. On March 2, 2000, Mills sought out Lt. Stubbs and asked to speak to him 
regarding the internal investigation. See R. 1531-41, at 1531 (OCPD Ex. 54 (Mills' 
Trans.)). Mills told Lt. Stubbs that he knew of two officers who might have had 
unauthorized or seemingly questionable dealings with a towing company, and named 
Huemiller and Zaugg. R. 1533. During his interview with Lt. Stubbs, Mills told Lt. 
Stubbs that at the incident at 29th and Madison, he overheard Huemiller calling OAB 
directly on a cellphone to come pick up the vehicle, and he had also overheard Huemiller 
at least ten times at accident scenes making a call on his cellphone and then OAB would 
show up at the scene when there had been no radio contact from OCPD. R. 3251-52; see 
also R. 406-16 (OCPD Ex. 10 (Mills Trans.)). 
61. During the investigation, Lt. Stubbs spoke to Clair Baur. R. 2794. Clair 
Baur told him that Keith Brady and former-OCPD Officer Burl Malmborg had directed 
tows to OAB and that Huemiller was "part of the original group" and was "probably" 
sending tows to OAB. See R. 383 (OCPD Ex. 7 (Stubbs' Supp. Rep.)). Clair told Lt. 
Stubbs that "things did not change much" with regard to tows after Chief Greenwood's 
investigation. Id. 
62. Lt. Stubbs interviewed Officer Scott McGregor, who told him that he and 
Huemiller had once gotten into a disagreement about sending confiscated tires, rims and a 
compressor to OAB for impound. R. 3262-63. Huemiller wanted the items to go to OAB 
and McGregor wanted to send them to Intermountain Auto because things "disappeared" 
from OAB. R. 3264. 
63. In his interview of Officer Michael Hunt, Hunt told Lt. Stubbs that he was 
personally aware of Zaugg using a cellphone to call OAB directly to the scene of 
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accidents. R. 377-78, at 378 (OCPD Ex. 7 (Stubbs' Supp. Rep). Hunt also told Lt. 
Stubbs that he filled out the impound slip on the 29th & Madison incident, but Huemiller 
told him which wrecker would be used. R. 3273-74; R. 378. 
64. During the interview with Lt. Stubbs, Huemiller told him he had "called 
Ogden Auto Body," and that it was "easy to talk people into requesting [OAB]." R. 3031. 
Keith Brady 
65. Brady worked as a police officer for OCPD from 1983 through mid-1995. 
R. 3133, 3140. He testified at the hearing that he was friends with Tom Baur and might 
have been introduced to Tom Baur by Huemiller. R. 3133. He also testified that there 
came a time when, as a police officer, he began directing tows to OAB by recommending 
OAB whenever there was a no preference tow, even though he knew the rotation system 
should have been used.13 R. 3134-3 5. 
66. Brady testified that he thought Huemiller was also directing tows to OAB 
because he knew OAB was also getting calls from Huemiller. R. 3135. Brady also 
admitted that he told Lt. Watt that Huemiller, Zaugg, and VanBeekum were directing 
tows to OAB.14 R. 3136-37; see also R. 638-47, at 640 (OCPD Ex. 47 (Brady Trans.)). 
Brady told Lt. Watt that he and Huemiller did not plan it, it was "just a hey let's send the 
13Brady resigned after OCPD received a complaint that a citizen had seen Brady 
driving her Cadillac. R. 3392. The citizen followed the car to Brady's house and then 
called OCPD and a wrecker to tow it back to OAB, because she understood that her 
insurance company had totaled the vehicle and OAB was simply storing it. R. 3393-94. 
14Brady told Lt. Watt during the IA that he also thought VanBeekum and Zaugg 
were directing tows because "they seem to come into the circle also, the friendship of you 
know going down, seeing Tom, hanging out." R. 640. This conversation was recorded 
and transcribed, and when Brady was asked by one Commissioner at the hearing whether 
the transcript was accurate, he said "yes." R. 3155. 
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business to Tom/' and that each knew the other was doing it. R. 640, 3137. He told Lt. 
Watt that Huemiller told him that he was directing tows to OAB.15 R. 640. 
67. Brady told Lt. Watt during the IA that since he left OCPD, he feels it is 
improper to direct tows because "your [sic] in a position of authority and it's just, your 
[sic] pushing the envelope a little bit by saying I'm going to send it here." R. 644. 
Doug Lucero 
68. Lucero, a seventeen-year OCPD officer, testified at the hearing that he was 
interviewed by Lt. Stubbs as part of the investigation. R. 3166, 3169. Lucero told Lt. 
Stubbs that after Chief Greenwood's 1996 investigation, Huemiller approached him and 
said "we should try to send business to Ogden Auto Body." R. 3169-70. Huemiller told 
Lucero he would appreciate anything he could do to increase tows to OAB rather than 
Brett's. R. 100-114, at 101-03 (OCPD Ex. 9 (Lucero Trans.)). 
69. Lucero told Lt. Stubbs that VanBeekum also asked him to send tows to 
OAB, and that he had "heard" that VanBeekum and Huemiller would recommend OAB 
on no preference tows and then call OAB directly on their cellphones. R. 104. 
Tom Baur 
70. Tom Baur, an owner of OAB and close friend of Huemiller's, was 
subpoenaed by OCPD but refused to appear and instead sent a "Notice of Intent to 
Exercise Fifth Amendment Right," which stated that Tom Baur would refuse to answer 
questions about "friendship or dealings" with Huemiller "until such time as Tom Baur 
15Brady testified that when he was interviewed by Lt. Watt during the I A, he 
explained to Lt. Watt how to get around the rotation by recommending OAB when the 
driver expressed no-preference. R. 3136. 
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receives immunity [from prosecution] by the Weber County Attorney's Office." R. 313; 
see also R. 3155-56.16 
Proffer Of Eric Young Testimony 
71. After Huemiller testified that he had never asked any other police officer to 
send tows to OAB, Eric Young, a police officer sitting in the audience, approached the 
OPCD's counsel and told him that Huemiller had made statements that were false, and 
offered to testify. R. 3157-58. Prior to the hearing, the officer had not known what the 
charges were against Huemiller. Huemiller objected to Young's testifying and, although 
Young would only have testified to impeach Huemiller's credibility, the Commission 
declined to allow Young to testify and stated it would restrict itself to information known 
to Chief Greiner at the time of his decision. R. 3159-3163. OCPD's counsel made a 
proffer as to Young's testimony: "He would testify that in the fall of 1997 on a Tuesday 
morning before 8:00 a.m. he was on his way to Dee Elementary, he came across an 
accident. . . Huemiller showed up later, and as he was there at the accident and starting to 
go about to request from the driver as to what their towing preference was . . . Huemiller 
came up to him and said see if you can get them to use Ogden Auto Body. . . . " R. 3165. 
INCIDENT AT 29th & MADISON 
72. On the morning of February 11, 2000, Huemiller was on patrol when he 
came upon a Bronco that had two tires in the gutter and two tires on a lawn. R. 2961. 
16OCPD informed the Commission of its intent to ask Tom Baur about certain 
issues and that Baur would take the fifth amendment on these questions, i.e.: (a) the 
cellphone and whether there was an arrangement that it was provided to Huemiller so that 
he could make direct phone calls to OAB; (b) whether Huemiller got deals from OAB; (c) 
whether Huemiller ever directed tows to OAB. R. 3156-57. 
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Three people were in the Bronco. R. 2961. Huemiller did not search the Bronco, and he 
testified that no drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in the Bronco. R. 3053, 3055. 
73. Huemiller testified that he decided that the Bronco should be seized for 
drugs. R. 3056. He testified that he called OAB on his OAB cellphone and told them to 
come get the Bronco. R. 2966, 3057. He said he just grabbed a cellphone from his car 
and it just happened to be the OAB cellphone. R. 3056-57. He admitted that even if it 
was a drug seizure, he should have gone through Wrecker Dispatch and not called 
directly. R. 3057. 
74. Huemiller had called Mills to come and check a driver who was suspected 
of driving under the influence ("DUI"). R. 2695-96. As a Drug Recognition Expert, 
Mills can conduct field sobriety tests. R. 2696-97. 
75. Mills conducted the search of the driver and during the search he found a 
marijuana pipe. R. 2701. Mills testified at the hearing that he did not tell Huemiller he 
had found the pipe, yet he heard Huemiller on his cellphone saying "Tom, come and get 
this car" when the search was going on. R. 2703, 2721-23; see also R. 1533. Mills also 
testified that it was improper for Huemiller to call a wrecker directly and that he should 
have gone through Wrecker Dispatch. R. 2715. 
76. Mills testified that if the impound had been for a drug seizure, the words 
"Drug Seizure" would have been written across the top or bottom of the impound slip; 
there is, however, no such notation on the impound slip. R. 2715-16; see also R. 1349-
1358 at 1358 (Aplt's Ex. 22 (29th & Madison impound slip)). 
77. John Valdez, of the Weber County Sheriffs Office, testified at the hearing 
that an agency that seizes a vehicle for drug reasons is required to give the tow company 
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driver a Utah State Impounding Report with "drug seizure" or "seizure" written in bold 
lettering across the top of the completed form. R. 2760. This is done so the Tax 
Commission will know it is a drug seizure (the impound form is for the Tax 
Commission's use) and that the vehicle is not to be sold at auction and instead might be 
subject to forfeiture. R. 2761. 
78. Chief Greiner, who is a member of the governing body of the Strike Force, 
testified that it is not the policy of the Strike Force to seize vehicles where only drug 
paraphernalia is found in the vehicle and that the Strike Force is not authorized to make 
seizures based only on paraphernalia. R. 3384-85. Chief Greiner testified extensively 
regarding the reasons behind this policy, and stated this policy was in effect at the time 
that Huemiller called OAB directly on the incident at 29th & Madison. See R. 3385-88. 
He testified that it is Strike Force policy that a vehicle is only to be seized if it is ua 
conveyance in transporting of drugs." R. 3387. 
ACCIDENT ONSR 79 
79. On February 18, 2000, a multi-vehicle accident caused by icy streets took 
place on State Road 79 (the "SR 79" accident). R. 2634-35; see also R. 1343-48 (Aplt's 
Ex. 21 (SR 79 Accident Rep.)). Huemiller was the first officer on the scene, and 
Patrolman Scott McGregor was the reporting officer. R. 2635, 2804. Three vehicles 
needed a tow, including a red Ford truck driven and owned by Armando Aparacio 
("Armando"). R. 2638-39. 
80. Huemiller told McGregor to call OAB to tow the red Ford truck, and 
McGregor called Wrecker Dispatch and gave OAB as the owner preference. R. 2638, 
2641, 2660, 2662. McGregor testified it would have been a violation of policy for him to 
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call OAB directly. R.2661. 
81. Detective Croyle assisted Lt. Stubbs in the IA. R. 3202. She was asked to 
contact Armando, the driver of the red Ford truck involved in the accident on SR 79, and 
gather more information. R. 3202-03; see also R. 599-602 (OCPD Ex. 30 (Croyle Notes 
& Armando's Stmt.)). 
82. Maggie Alvarez, a friend of Armando's who is bilingual, assisted in 
Croyle's interview of Armando by acting as an interpreter. R. 3203-04. Armando told 
Croyle through Maggie that an officer asked him at the accident if he had a wrecker 
preference, he said no, and the officer suggested OAB. R. 3205. 
83. On June 9, 2000, Croyle met with Armando and Maggie and obtained a 
statement from Armando. R. 3210; see also R. 600-602 (Armando's Stmt.). Armando 
told Croyle during the meeting that he could understand English. R. 3210. Croyle spoke 
to Armando in person and he told her through Maggie Alvarez that the officer 
recommended OAB. R. 3209. Armando described the officer who recommended OAB 
as a white male, 5? 6" to 5f 8", with light blond hair. R. 3206, 3209. 
84. During the meeting, Lt. Stubbs brought out a box of badges, stripes, etc., 
and Armando pointed to a gold badge and some stripes and said that this was what the 
officer that he spoke to was wearing. R. 3217, 3219. The badge and stripes were what a 
Sergeant would wear, and Huemiller was a Sergeant at the time. R. 3217. Chief Greiner 
testified that Huemiller was the only Sergeant at the SR 79 accident, and as such was the 
only officer there wearing stripes on his sleeve. R. 3391. 
85. Armando told Croyle he was alone in his truck when the accident happened, 
but two of his brothers were passing by, but that neither of his brothers talked to the 
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officer. R. 3219-20; see also R. 600-01 (Armando's Stmt.). One of these brothers was 
Bulmaro Aparicio ("Bulmaro"). Id. Armando's statement states that: (a) the officer who 
suggested OAB gave him a business card (R. 1341); (b) the office who gave him the card 
had stripes on his sleeve (R. 1341); (c) he had wanted to drive the truck away but the 
officer told him it had to be towed because the airbag had gone off (R. 1342); (d) his 
brother, Bulmaro, had been driving by the accident and had pulled over and taken him 
home(R. 1341). 
86. Huemiller contended at the Commission hearing that he spoke to 
Armando's brother, Bulmaro Aparacio, at the accident scene, not Armando, and that 
Bulmaro told him to call OAB. R. 2958-59. 
87. OCPD subpoenaed Armando as a witness for trial. R. R. 673-74, 3425. 
Armando suddenly left for Mexico after Huemiller made a visit to the home of Bulmaro, 
shortly before the hearing. R. 2688-89. Bulmaro then appeared as a witness for 
Huemiller. 
88. Bulmaro testified that two weeks before the hearing, Huemiller came to his 
house to talk to him. R. 2678. Bulmaro admitted at the hearing that OCPD's attorneys 
talked to him a week before the hearing and when they asked if he had ever talked to 
Huemiller about the accident, he told them no. R. 2689-90. At the hearing, Bulmaro 
explained his inconsistent statements by saying he lied to OCPD's attorneys. R. 2690. 
89. OCPD first learned about Bulmaro and Huemiller's contention that he had 
talked to Bulmaro at the SR 79 accident scene, in June of 2001 during Huemiller's Work 
Force Services appeal of denial of his unemployment benefits. R. 2573, 2830. Huemiller 
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admitted that he never said anything about this to Chief Greiner. R. 3104. 
HUEMILLER'S ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT REPORTS 
90. At the hearing, Christina Ortega, an employee of Huemiller's attorneys, put 
together a chart from vehicle accident reports that purported to show all accidents in 
which Huemiller was "involved" from 1996 until the beginning of the internal 
investigation, for the purpose of exonerating Huemiller by showing that OAB or an OAB 
affiliate had been called to very few of the accidents in which Huemiller was involved. 
R. 2608, 2610; see also R. 121284-1288 (Aplt's Ex. 6 & Ex. 7 ("Huemiller-Officer 
Statistical Reports" Chart)). 
91. The evidence established that Ms. Ortega's chart greatly underestimated the 
number of accidents in which Huemiller was involved for several reasons.18 Nonetheless, 
17Huemiller's counsel objected to him telling the Commission anything that 
Huemiller had said in the hearing on his unemployment appeal. R. 3563-64. 
18These reasons included the following: (1) Ms. Ortega identified OAB, Ogden 
Towing, Auto Body Repair, Jeffs Towing, and Baur & Baur as the towing companies 
that she was told to look for, and she admitted she did not check for calls to OAB 
affiliates Ogden Auto Sales, Ogden Towing and Hauling, and Victor's Towing, and had 
not been told by Huemiller's attorneys that these were also OAB affiliates (R. 2610, 
2615, 2620-21); (2) Ms. Ortega admitted she did not know that Huemiller was a Sergeant 
during the relevant time period, and thus could go to any accident and there would be no 
record of his being there unless he chose to "sign off on the accident (R. 2621-22); (3) 
Ms. Ortega admitted she did not review Huemiller's work log to see what other accidents 
he might have attended (R. 2622); (4) Ms. Ortega admitted the chart did not include the 
incident at 29th & Madison on February 11, 2000, where Huemiller admitted calling 
OAB directly (R. 2622-23); (5) Ms. Ortega admitted she did not know whether an 
accident she had listed on the chart as "call per policy" was or was not made pursuant to 
"policy" (R. 2624); (6) Ms. Ortega admitted she did not know that Huemiller had been in 
the Strike Force from 1996-2000 (R. 2625); (7) Lt. Stubbs testified that when Huemiller 
was in Strike Force he worked overtime for the City and would have come in contact with 
accidents at that time, and he also testified that, since Huemiller was a Sergeant and was 
not required to "call out" at the scene of an accident, the background material reviewed 
by Ms. Ortega to compile the list of accidents where Huemiller would actually "represent 
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the 2000 "accident" list on Huemiller compiled by Ms. Ortega shows that four out of the 
six tows shown were to OAB. R. 2831-32. Ms. Ortega further admitted that her chart 
showed that, of the accidents in which Huemiller was reported as involved, OAB and its 
affiliates were dispatched more than any other towing company. R. 2628. 
E. EVIDENCE OF HUEMILLER'S DISHONESTY 
HUEMILLER JS STA TEMENTS TO CHIEF GREENWOOD IN THE 1996IA 
92. Chief Greenwood testified that the OCPD towing procedure was to "call the 
Dispatcher and request either a wrecker and give the name of the person that requested it, 
or if there's no preference, just ask for a no preference wrecker." R. 3107. He testified 
that officers were not supposed to give recommendations, even if asked (R. 3107), and 
that they were never authorized to call a wrecker without going through Dispatch (R. 
3108). 
93. Chief Greenwood testified that recommending a wrecker to a no-preference 
vehicle owner would be directing tows and would be a violation of OCPD policy. R. 
3118. 
94. Chief Greenwood testified that he conducted Garrity interviews with 
officers as part of his investigation, and also reviewed OCPD cellphone logs, including 
those of Huemiller. R. 3111, 3124. While interviewing the officers, including Huemiller, 
he took notes which he then used to write summaries of the interviews. R. 3112. He 
testified that his summary of Huemiller's interview was accurate. R. 3114; see also R. 
only a mere fraction of the accidents [Huemiller] would normally go to over the course of 
a year" (R. 2832, 3619). The chart compiled by Ms. Ortega does prove that Huemiller 
was at vehicle accident scenes when he was on the Strike Force. R. 2625; R. 1286-88. 
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319-336, at R. 330-332 & 334 (Greenwood Summ. of Huemiller interview). 
95. Before the interview with Huemiller, Chief Greenwood testified that he 
made sure that Huemiller knew what he meant by "circumventing" Wrecker Dispatch, 
and that there is "no doubt in my mind he understood what the gist of the conversation 
was, we were there talking about whether he was going outside of established procedure 
to call for a wrecker." R. 3127. 
96. During the interview, Huemiller told Chief Greenwood "right off the bat" 
that he had made two calls to a wrecker from his cellphone. R. 3113. He said that 
someone had requested OAB and he called to expedite the process. R. 3113-14. Chief 
Greenwood said that Huemiller "acknowledged that wasn't the right way to do it." R. 
3114. 
97. During the interview, Huemiller was adamant that those were the only two 
times he had ever called OAB, and he had "never ever called OAB or any other wrecker 
unless a citizen requests them." R. 330, 3114. Chief Greenwood testified that during the 
interview, Huemiller "went on to say that he hadn't encouraged or directed anybody to 
ask." R.3128. 
98. Chief Greenwood also asked Huemiller whether he "had any other 
information about these allegations that I should know, and he said he didn't." R. 3115. 
Chief Greenwood testified that what he was: 
trying to get from that statement is the question that you had asked me 
about a year ago, and do you have any information about somebody doing 
this about these tows, and if you're not, is there somebody else that is that 
we should know about, if you have information we need to know that, and 
under Garrity he was obliged to, and particularly, what he knows about. 
R.3116. 
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99. Huemiller told Chief Greenwood he had not directed tows to OAB, did not 
know of anyone who had, and understood he was not supposed to and had not. R. 3114. 
100. Chief Greenwood testified that one of the purposes of the interviews was to 
determine whether OAB was being "recommended" or business being "solicited" and that 
Huemiller never told him he was doing that. R. 3117-18. Chief Greenwood testified that 
Huemiller "denied any~any implication whatsoever in soliciting business, calling 
wreckers or recommending tows." R. 3118. 
101. Huemiller told Chief Greenwood during the interview that the only thing 
that he had received from OAB was a t-shirt. R. 3114-15, 3027. He denied to Chief 
Greenwood that he had ever benefitted from his and Tom Baur's relationship. R. 3084. 
102. Huemiller admitted at the hearing that he told Chief Greenwood in 1996 
that he had "never directed tows out of the procedure, the way we do it, for Ogden Auto 
Body." R. 3083-84. Huemiller also admitted that before the Greenwood investigation he 
would recommend OAB to vehicle owners who had no preference, and then write it down 
as an OAB preference tow. R. 3009. 
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY REGARDING 29™ & MADISON INCIDENT 
103. After hearing Mills testify at the hearing that he had not told Huemiller it 
was a drug seizure at the time Huemiller made the call, Huemiller was examined by his 
attorney about the 29th & Madison incident. See R. 2964-2966. He testified that he 
called OAB because he knew it was a drug seizure even though no drugs were in the 
vehicle, because "we had seen the [marijuana] pipe come out of his pocket." R. 2965-66. 
104. On cross-examination Huemiller admitted that it could be "correct" when 
Mills testified that Huemiller was calling OAB before Mills even told Huemiller there 
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was marijuana in the pipe. R. 3055-56. He also admitted that he was the person who 
decided it was a drug seizure: 
Q: So you're the one who made the determination it was a drug seizure; 
correct? 
A: It was a drug seizure. 
R. 3056. 
105. Huemiller's statement that he thought it was a drug seizure because he saw 
paraphernalia conflicts with his statement to Lt. Stubbs during the IA? wherein he said 
that "[t]he only reason I called at that time was because my understanding was that it was 
a drug seizure. That's what I was told by the two officers." R. 530 (Huemiller Trans, 
(emphasis added)). 
HUEMILLER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE SR 79 ACCIDENT 
106. There was substantial evidence that Huemiller's testimony at the hearing, 
that Bulmaro told him to call OAB, was not credible. Huemiller testified that before he 
told McGregor to call OAB, he first stopped and helped control traffic, then talked to the 
driver of an 18-wheeler, then talked to McGregor who told him to check on tows, and 
then talked to Bulmaro and other drivers about tows, and he then came back and told 
McGregor to call OAB as a preference tow. See R. 3063-64. Huemiller testified that this 
took about 1/2 hour. R. 3065. However, the Incident Inquiry for the accident shows that 
Huemiller arrived at the scene between 3:54 a.m. and 3:57 a.m., and that OAB was 
dispatched pursuant to McGregor's call no more than nine minutes later-at 4:03 a.m. R. 
3065-67; see also R. 1042 (Aplt's Ex. 5 (Incident Inquiry for SR 79)). 
LT STUBS'S TESTIMONY 
107. Based on his interview of Huemiller, Lt. Stubbs concluded that Huemiller 
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was being deceptive and had lied to Chief Greenwood during the 1996 investigation. R. 
2835, 3280. 
108. At the hearing, Lt. Stubbs provided the reasons why he concluded that 
Huemiller was being evasive and deceptive in the interview, including that Huemiller: (a) 
contradicted himself repeatedly and was inconsistent in his answers; (b) avoided 
answering questions and Lt. Stubbs had to "pull information out of him"; (c) told Stubbs 
he had "barely used" the OAB cellphone when he had used it 159 times; (d) asked "silly 
questions" "in response to Lt. Stubbs' "straightforward questions"; (e) told Lt. Stubbs that 
prior to the Greenwood Memo he was "doing it," but he had told Chief Greenwood he 
was not; (f) parsed words, saying "circumventing Wrecker Dispatch is one issue; calling 
without a preference is another"; (g) told Stubbs "it was easy to talk people into 
requesting"; (h) when asked whether he knew anyone who was "out of policy," responded 
that "to my knowledge there is no policy, so out of policy is a broad thing"; (i) took a 
very long time to finally admit regarding directing tows that "[i]t's not supposed to be 
done." R. 3281-3304. 
109. Lt. Stubbs concluded that Huemiller was not being truthful about the 29th 
& Madison incident because: (a) even Huemiller admitted there was no drug 
paraphernalia in the vehicle, which does not justify a seizure of a borrowed vehicle when 
the registered owner is not driving it; (b) "if Tony had thought it was a proper seizure, 
proper impound and proper Department business, then why wasn't he using the 
Department's telephone that they issued to him simply for that purpose instead of the 
[OAB] cellphone that he had in his car?"; (c) a uniform officer is supposed to go through 
Wrecker Dispatch even if it is a drug seizure; (d) Mills heard Huemiller calling OAB and 
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saying to "come pick up a DUI," not a drug seizure; (e) Huemiller told Lt. Stubbs he 
called because he "understood" it was a drug seizure because "I was told that by the other 
two officers/' but the other officers at the scene stated that they never told Huemiller it 
was a drug seizure and in fact it was not a drug seizure. R. 3296-99. 
110. Lt. Stubbs testified that Mills' report of seeing Huemiller on his cellphone 
and OAB's then showing up was significant to him, because it was a "pattern that has 
arisen out of talking to other people" and showed that OAB was brought to an accident 
scene by something other than Wrecker Dispatch. R. 3252. 
111. Based on his interviews and investigation, Lt. Stubbs concluded that there 
was evidence that Huemiller, Zaugg, and VanBeekum were doing favors for OAB in their 
capacities as police officers in return for favors that they were getting. R. 2829. 
LT. WATTS'TESTIMONY 
112. Lt. Randy Watt prepared the report on the internal affairs investigation. See 
337-340 (City's Ex. 3 (IA Report)). Lt. Watt also conducted interviews, including two 
interviews of former police officer Keith Brady, who admitted that he and Huemiller 
improperly sent tows to OAB. See R. 345. 
113. Lt. Watt testified that he concluded that Huemiller was improperly sending 
tow business to OAB based on: (a) Brady's statement to him; (b) Lucero's, Zaugg's, and 
VanBeekum's interviews with Lt. Stubbs; (c) Mills' statements about the 29th & Madison 
incident and his observations of Huemiller's making cellphone calls and then OAB's 
showing up at accident scenes; (d) Clair Baur's statement to Stubbs; and (e) Armando's 
statement. R. 3342-45. 
114. Lt. Watts testified that he sustained the allegation that Huemiller was 
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receiving gifts from OAB in return for towing business, based on: (a) evidence and 
statements that Huemiller was obtaining vehicles from OAB; (b) Brady's statement that 
Huemiller obtained the Geo Tracker and did not pay OAB for it until it was sold; (c) 
Huemiller's driving an OAB truck for three days on dealer plates; (d) Croyle's statement 
that the Nissan (with dealer plates) had been at the Huemiller home and that OAB had 
given to the Huemillers to drive or sell; (e) that Huemiller, Zaugg and VanBeekum had 
OAB cellphones; (f) if there was no problem with the OAB cellphone there was no reason 
for Huemiller to return it to OAB; (g) Clair Baur's admitting Huemiller drove an 
impounded vehicle for personal use; (h) the difference between Huemiller's and Tom 
Baur's versions of the PPG trip; (i) Huemiller had a "sharp" and "brilliant investigative 
mind"but responses in the interview with Lt. Stubbs show equivocation; (j) Huemiller's 
responses to Lt. Stubbs about the cellphone. R. 3346-54. 
115. Lt. Watt testified that he sustained the allegation that Huemiller, Zaugg, and 
VanBeekum were "on the take" to the detriment of free enterprise, the auto body repair 
industry, and OCPD, based on the fact that, based on these officers' actions, there was 
clear animosity by wreckers and they felt they were not being treated fairly regarding 
tows and money to be realized from repairs. R. 3354-57. 
116. Lt. Watt testified that he sustained the allegation that Huemiller had 
violated the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, the Law Enforcement Code of Conduct, 
and OCPD Values, based on violations of integrity rules, bringing discredit to the City, 
failing to comply with orders, failure to follow OCPD rules, misconduct, failing to answer 
truthfully, engaging in illegal conduct, using his office for personal profit, receiving 
bribes, driving impounded vehicles, driving an unregistered vehicle, insubordination by 
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contacting McGregor when he had been told not to, using threatening language to 
McGregor to retaliate against McGregor for talking to Stubbs. R. 3357-72 ; see also R. 
554-55 (OCPD Ex. 23 (OCPD Policy on Personal Conduct)); R. 556-567 (OCPD Ex. 24 
(OCPD Policies)); R. 567-569 (OCPD Ex. 25 (law Enforcement Policies)); R. 623-634 
(OCPD Exs. 37-43 (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-105 (receiving bribe), 76-8-106 (receiving 
bribe), 41-la-1101 (seizure of vehicles), 41-1 a-1303 (driving unregistered vehicle), 41-3-
501 (dealer plates), 76-8-508 (tampering with witness), 76-9-201 (telephone abuse). 
HUEMILLER'S STATEMENTS IN PREDETERMINATION HEARING 
117. Huemiller told Chief Greiner in the predetermination hearing that he had 
"talked to Tom Bauer on the phone when I've been at work, but I've never called him for 
a tow." R. 3084-85. 
118. In the predetermination hearing, Huemiller agreed with his attorney that 
"what Tony is saying, and I want this to be, is that whether it's an official policy, whether 
it's a memo, whether it's expired or whatever, he's not violated the procedure set forth in 
that memo." R. 3085. 
119. Chief Greiner testified that he did not think Huemiller was being truthful to 
him in the statements Huemiller did make at the predetermination hearing. R. 3404. He 
also testified that he was disappointed when he did not get specific information from 
Huemiller in the predetermination hearing in response to the allegations. R. 3406. 
120. After the predetermination hearing, Chief Greiner talked to Chief 
Greenwood about what had taken place in Huemiller's 1996 interview. R. 3407. 
121. Chief Greiner testified that, after reviewing everything and speaking with 
Chief Greenwood, he concluded that Huemiller had not been honest and had lied during 
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the 2000 investigation. R. 3408. 
IMPORTANCE OF HONESTY IN POLICE OFFICERS 
122. Chief Greenwood testified that "unequivocally officers can never lie, if they 
do they have no credibility in police work." R. 3119. 
123. Gary Heward, Deputy Weber County Attorney and witness for Huemiller, 
testified that as an officer of the court, he cannot use an officer as a witness if he does not 
believe the officer will testify truthfully. R. 2581, 2589. He testified he would be 
"troubled" to have an officer on the stand who lied in an administrative hearing. R. 2592. 
124. Lt. Watt testified that, to him, the most significant violation by Huemiller 
was lying, because "[a]n officer's veracity can never be doubted." R. 3373. He testified 
that Sergeant is one of the two key position in a police department because the Sergeant is 
the person "who leads the troops" and shapes, guides, directs and mentors them, and is 
responsible for their careers. R. 3373. He stated that: 
a Sergeant who cannot be trusted, who people would doubt in the future 
when he raised his hand and swore an oath, whether it was in court, or 
whether it was in any other activity pertaining to his office, a Sergeant who 
cannot be trusted or who the troops believe is not one hundred percent true 
and faithful and exercises fidelity in the trust of his office, is an—is an 
extreme detriment to the organization, and it can't happen. . . . To have 
people question the veracity of our officers is something that—that is just 
too important to let pass. 
R. 3374. 
125. Chief Greiner testified that he believed Huemiller's termination was 
justified because: 
We're back to the paramount issue of integrity. I cannot afford to have a 
police officer sitting on a stand in a criminal matter and have his integrity 
impugned by the first question out of the defense attorney's mouth being 
"have you ever lied in an administrative investigation, what makes this jury 
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believe that you won't lie here today?" 
R. 3424. 
126. Chief Greiner testified he cannot risk dismissal of a major criminal case 
because an officer on the stand has engaged in administrative dishonesty. R. 3424. 
F. EVIDENCE THAT HUEMILLER ENGAGED IN CONDUCT 
UNBECOMING AN OFFICER 
127. Huemiller admitted at the hearing that Lt. Stubbs told him not to discuss the 
case with anyone except his wife. R. 3079. 
128. McGregor testified that after Huemiller's interview with Lt. Stubbs, 
Huemiller called McGregor's home and left a message on his answering machine saying 
"you son of a bitch you better call me up or I'm going to kick your ass." R. 2664; see 
also R. 417-426 at 423 (OCPD Ex. 11 (McGregor Trans.)). McGregor then called 
Huemiller and the conversation went as follows: 
I says, what's up? He says all that you, you gave me up. And I says, what 
do you mean? He says, I went and had an interview. I'm suspended. And 
they told me that you gave me up. I says, well believe what you have to 
believe.... 
R. 424 (McGregor Trans.). Huemiller also called McGregor a "fucking rat," and said 
"you turned on me." R. 424-25. McGregor testified at the hearing that he could tell that 
Huemiller was mad at him when he called McGregor. R. 2665. 
129. McGregor testified that he knew that Huemiller had received a direct order 
not to talk to anyone about the investigation, and that he told Huemiller they should not 
be talking about the investigation. R. 2665-66. 
G. EVIDENCE RE APPROPRIATENESS OF DISCIPLINE 
130. Lt. Watt testified that he is not aware of any OCPD officer who has lied in 
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an administrative investigation who has not been fired. R. 3374-75. 
131. Chief Greiner testified that his administration has terminated three or four 
officers who lied in IAs. R. 3411-12. Huemiller's counsel objected to OCPD's providing 
specific information on termination, and his objection was sustained. See id. 
132. Chief Greiner testified that before his administration but while Huemiller 
was an officer, Sergeant Roger VanCleve was allowed to retire after he lied in a statement 
about how he got a "ding" in his police car. R. 3413-14. VanCleve had reported that it 
had happened in a hit and run, but he actually had backed into a pole. R. 3414-15. 
133. At the hearing, Chief Greiner commented on and compared to Huemiller all 
of the disciplines of other officers that Huemiller had raised at the hearing. See R. 3417-; 
see also 1428-1498 (Aplt's Ex. 38-45 (Discipline Reports). Chief Greiner testified that 
he did not believe that any of the offenses of other officers rose to the gravity of 
Huemiller's offences. See 3417-24. 
134. Chief Greiner testified with regard to the officer who had lied to a park 
ranger, that the officer told the truth during the administrative investigation. R. 3419. 
135. With regard to the officers who were fighting in a bar, Chief Greiner 
testified that Huemiller was his "standard" for determining how to discipline the officers 
because Huemiller had previously been disciplined for fighting in a bar. R. 3421. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should find that the Ogden Civil Service Commission correctly 
affirmed Police Chief Jon Greiner's decision to terminate Huemiller, based on the charges 
against Huemiller and the substantial evidence that supported the Commission's findings. 
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First, Huemiller failed to meet his burden to marshal the evidence in order to 
challenge the Commission's factual findings. The Commission's factual findings 
therefore are deemed conclusive. 
Second, based on relevant standards and Huemiller's failure to respond to the 
allegations in the predetermination hearing, Huemiller has waived any objections to Chief 
Greiner's decision to terminate him. Since Chief Greiner's task was to make a decision 
with the assistance of potentially exonerating input from Huemiller, and Huemiller 
refused to assist him in this, Chief Greiner was entitled to "take into consideration the 
failure of the employee to respond." This refusal also meant that Chief Greiner had to 
make a decision based only on the evidence obtained in the IA. Likewise, since the 
Commission can reverse the discipline imposed by Chief Greiner only if he exceeded his 
scope of discretion, and Chief Greiner's disciplinary action must be reviewed "in light of 
all the circumstances underlying the termination," the Commission cannot be faulted for 
finding that the action of termination was proper. 
Third, this Court should give great deference to the Commission's findings that 
Huemiller misrepresented the truth based on its determination that Huemiller was not a 
credible witness. This Court has held that appellate courts must defer to the trial court on 
the credibility of conflicting evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, and must defer to a Commission on issues of credibility. Since this entire case 
hinges on credibility, and the Commission specifically found that Huemiller was not 
credible, its factual findings should stand. This is particularly true given the fact that, 
contrary to Huemiller's denials at the hearing, there is overwhelming evidence that he 
violated OCPD's towing policy and then lied about it. 
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Fourth, the Commission's factual findings should also be affirmed based on the 
"substantial evidence" standard. Based on the witnesses, exhibits, and Huemiller's own 
lack of credibility, the Commission properly found that: (a) Huemiller misrepresented the 
truth by lying during an IA (Greenwood's IA or the 2000 IA, or both), by lying to Chief 
Greiner during the predetermination hearing, and by making false statements during the 
hearing (regarding the 29th & Madison incident, regarding the SR 79 accident, among 
other things); (b) Huemiller violated OCPD policy by directing tows to OAB; (c) 
Huemiller had a conflict of interest; and (d) Huemiller exhibited conduct unbecoming an 
officer by disobeying a direct order when he telephoned McGregor and made comments 
to and confronted him about the case. 
Fifth, the Commission properly affirmed the action of termination. Huemiller had 
the burden to show that his discipline was not consistent with prior disciplines or was 
overly severe, and he failed to do this. As a preliminary matter, Huemiller is estopped 
from even making this argument since he objected to OCPD's eliciting testimony about 
other officers who were terminated for lying in an IA. Further, since Zaugg and 
VanBeekum were also terminated for violating the towing policy, the discipline was 
clearly consistent. Huemiller also failed to produce any evidence of a Sergeant (or 
anyone else) who lied in an IA and was not terminated, and none of the officers identified 
by Huemiller at the hearing are similarly situated to him with regard to prior offenses, 
rank and misconduct. Finally, every high-ranking officer who testified agreed that it was 
impossible to keep an officer who has been shown to have lied in an IA. 
Sixth, Huemiller's argument that he was deprived of due process and prejudiced 
by the procedure at the hearing is without merit for several reasons. OCPD produced 
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every document requested and went to extraordinary lengths to provide Huemiller with 
everything he requested including detailed explanations of the reasons for his termination. 
Furthermore, Commission Rule 10-6 is consistent with this Court's instruction that the 
"'party challenging the action carries the burden of demonstrating its impropriety."5 The 
fact that Huemiller went first at the hearing did not violate due process. The Commission 
heard all of the evidence and witnesses offered by Huemiller. Both parties gave opening 
and closing statements, and Huemiller was also allowed to both present and cross-
examine witnesses and introduce exhibits. Finally, even if the burden of proof with 
regard to factual issues had been on Huemiller, which it was not, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals has explicitly stated that this does not violate due process. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FACTUAL FINDINGS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE 
HUEMILLER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
It is well-settled that to challenge the Commission's factual findings Huemiller 
must marshal all evidence supporting the findings and then show that despite these facts, 
and in light of conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Whitear v. Labor Comm 'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998); see also Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9). If an appellant fails to marshal evidence, the 
appellate court will not address a challenge to factual findings and must assume they are 
correct. Id. at 985; see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). 
Although Huemiller contends he has marshaled the evidence (Aplt's Brf., n.l), a 
cursory review of OCPD's Facts shows he did not. For example, Huemiller failed to 
include substantial evidence that, contrary to his denials, he repeatedly violated the OCPD 
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towing policy. This evidence the testimonies of: (a) Lucero, who testified Huemiller 
asked him to direct tows to OAB; (b) Mills, who testified that at least ten times he had 
seen Huemiller making a call from his cellphone and then OAB would show up; and (c) 
Keith Brady, who testified that both he and Huemiller directed tows to OAB. OCPD 
Facts 58, 60, 66, 68. Nor does he mention the interviews of Zaugg, VanBeekum, Lucero, 
Mills, Clair Baur and Hunt, who each said Huemiller directed tows to OAB. OCPD Facts 
58-61. 
Huemiller5s failure to mention the Commission's specific finding that he was "not 
a credible witness" during the hearing (R. 1559), or to marshal the evidence regarding his 
conflicting testimony is particularly egregious since the record reveals several examples 
of deceit by Huemiller, including the following: (1) his testimony that he had registered 
his Geo Tracker and did not drive it for months on OAB dealer plates, which was not true 
as demonstrated by the DMV List he offered into evidence; (2) his testimony that he 
determined that the incident at 29th and Madison was a drug seizure and made the call to 
OAB because he saw drug paraphanelia during the search, which was contradicted by his 
statement to Lt. Stubbs in the IA that the two officers told him it was a drug seizure; (3) 
his false statements and excuses regarding the OAB cellphone; and (4) his testimony that 
Bulmaro told him to call OAB regarding the SR 79 accident. OCPD Facts 7-10, 103-105. 
Perhaps most glaring point is Huemiller's utter failure to address the compelling 
testimony of Chief Greenwood regarding the substance of his IA interview of Huemiller 
in 1996. Huemiller goes to great lengths in an attempt to show consistency between 
Huemiller's statements to Chief Greenwood in the 1996 IA and his statements to Lt. 
Stubbs in the 2000 IA. All of Huemiller's efforts are for naught, because he relies solely 
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on the written summary of the interview in Greenwood's Report while completely 
ignoring the Chief Greenwood's detailed and compelling testimony regarding the 
substance of his interview with Huemiller in 1996. This testimony, as discussed in 
greater detail below, conclusively establishes that Huemiller lied to Chief Greenwood. 
Although the record is replete with such evidence in support of the Commission's 
findings, it is impossible to provide every example in this argument. However, OCPD's 
Facts show conclusively that Huemiller failed to marshal the evidence as required. The 
Commission's factual findings accordingly should be affirmed. 
II. HUEMILLER WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO CHALLENGE FACTS ON 
APPEAL AS WELL AS THE DISCIPLINE IMPOSED 
This Court should summarily affirm Huemiller's termination, based on his failure 
to respond or offer explanations to Chief Greiner in the predetermination hearing . 
Failure to raise an issue below results in waiver of any objections related to that issue. 
Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm 'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 868 
P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, "below" is the predetermination hearing before Chief Greiner, where 
Huemiller was informed of the facts and allegations against him, provided with names 
and dates, and given the opportunity to respond, ask questions and give explanations. See 
Statement of Case, supra. Instead of doing this, Huemiller refused to answer, took the 
fifth amendment, and simply offered a general denial. He did this, even though Chief 
Greiner specifically told him " you need to also understand that this is probably the last 
opportunity, or one of the last opportunities, you'll have to discuss this with me." R. 98. 
The relevant standard for the Commission in reviewing Chief Greiner's findings 
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was to determine whether the "facts support the charges made by the department head." 
Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758; Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, \ 16, 8 P.3d 1048. On appeal, the 
Commission's findings are then reviewed in light of the entire record, and under a 
substantial evidence standard. Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758. 
Based on this, this Court should summarily affirm Chief Greiner's and the 
Commission's factual findings. Chief Greiner's task was to make a decision with the 
assistance of potentially exonerating input from Huemiller. Huemiller had the 
opportunity, and was urged, to explain and provide answers to Chief Greiner regarding 
the allegations and charges against him, but he refused to do so. The United States 
Supreme Court found in LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262 (1998),19 that an employee 
may refuse under the fifth amendment to answer an agency's investigatory questions, but 
that the agency is entitled under those circumstances to "take into consideration the 
failure of the employee to respond" and to make an adverse inference against the 
employee who refuses to testify in investigation. Id. at 267 (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 U.S. 308 (1976), for proposition that fifth amendment "does not forbid adverse 
inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify."). 
Huemiller's refusal placed Chief Greiner in the position of having to make a 
decision based only on the evidence obtained in the IA. Accordingly, Huemiller cannot 
now complain that Chief Greiner's decision was not supported. 
Furthermore, Huemiller's statements to Chief Greiner in the hearing that he 
refused to answer unless he received a Garrity warning do not excuse his failure to 
19OCPD cited Ericksen and its holding to the Commission in its closing argument. 
R. 3480-82. 
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answer or explain. The "Garrity warning" derives from Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 
385 U.S. 493 (1967), which dealt with incriminating statements made in administrative 
hearings. OCPD had no legal obligation to grant Huemiller a Garrity warning in a 
predetermination hearing. Moreover, Chief Greiner was entitled to make an adverse 
inference from Huemiller's contention that he could not answer unless protected by a 
Garrity warning. See Erickson, 522 U.S. at 267. 
Huemiller also cannot complain about the action of termination imposed by Chief 
Greiner, since he left Chief Greiner virtually no alternative. The relevant standard is that 
"discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the 
Chief." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 761. The Chiefs disciplinary action must be reviewed "in 
light of all the circumstances underlying the termination." Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, ^ f 24, 
8 P.3d 1048. The circumstances underlying the termination are that Huemiller had the 
opportunity to provide explanations, but made a conscious choice not to do so. Chief 
Greiner therefore cannot be faulted for terminating Huemiller, particularly in light of the 
overwhelming evidence that Huemiller was directing tows, including the statements of 
VanBeekum, Zaugg, Brady, Lucero, Miller, Clair Baur and Michael Hunt, and the 
circumstances of the 29th and Madison incident and the SR 79 accident. In the face of this 
evidence and Huemiller's taking the fifth amendment, Chief Greiner could only conclude 
that Huemiller was lying to him when he offered his conclusory denials. 
In sum, based on relevant standards of review, Huemiller waived any right to 
appeal the Commission's decision to affirm Chief Greiner's termination of Huemiller. 
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III. THE COURT SHOULD DEFER TO THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS RE 
LACK OF CREDIBILITY AND MISREPRESENTATION OF THE TRUTH 
The Commission's factual findings should be summarily affirmed because its 
determination that Huemiller lacked credibility makes it impossible for him to show there 
is not substantial evidence to support the finding that he misrepresented the truth. The 
most significant findings of the Commission are that Huemiller misrepresented the truth 
and that he "was not a credible witness during the August 13-15, 2001, hearing." R. 
1558-59. This finding means that, after hearing and observing Huemiller in person, and 
assessing his credibility and comparing it with that of other witnesses and the evidence, 
the Commission simply did not believe him. This Court has made clear that appellate 
courts may not "determine the credibility of conflicting evidence or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom," and must defer to the trial court in such assessments. 
See, e.g., Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, fflj 27-29, 76 P.3d 1173 (citations omitted); see 
also, Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758 (appellate court does not "review the Commission's findings 
de novo or reweigh the evidence," and "defers to the Commission's findings on issues of 
credibility"). As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in State v. Pena, appellate courts 
"cannot hope to garner from a cold record" a sense of the proceedings or the credibility of 
witnesses. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
These standards are particularly relevant here, where the Commissioners spent 
three days in contact with Huemiller and observed and assessed his demeanor, parsing of 
words, long pauses, evasions, and flippancy as a witness. Lt. Stubbs, a skilled and 
experienced criminal investigator, reached the same conclusion regarding Huemiller's 
lack of credibility, and he testified that he did not believe Huemiller because Huemiller: 
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(a) contradicted himself repeatedly with inconsistent answers; (b) avoided answering 
questions and had to have information "pulled out of him"; (c) told Stubbs he had "barely 
used" the OAB cellphone when he had used it 159 times; (d) asked "silly questions" "in 
response to "straightforward questions"; (e) parsed words, saying "circumventing 
Wrecker Dispatch is one issue; calling without a preference is another"; (f) when asked 
whether he knew anyone who was "out of policy," responded that "to my knowledge 
there is no policy, so out of policy is a broad thing"; and (g) took a very long time to 
admit an officer is not supposed to direct tows. OCPD Facts 108-09. Lt. Watts reached 
the same conclusion regarding Huemiller's lack of credibility. OCPD Facts 113-16. 
The Commission's determination that Huemiller lacked credibility and 
misrepresented the truth is supported by an overwhelming body of evidence, which is 
discussed in detail in the next section. In summary, this evidence includes Huemiller's: 
(a) inconsistent statements to Chief Greenwood in the IA in 1996, as compared to his 
statements to Lt. Stubbs in the IA in 2000; (b) false statement regarding the registration of 
the Geo Tracker; (c) misrepresentations regarding the SR 79 accident; (d) lack of 
credibility regarding why he obtained and how he used the OAB cellphone; (e) 
inconsistent testimony regarding the 29th & Madison incident; (f) claim that he did not 
direct tows to OAB was not credible in the face of the substantial evidence to the 
contrary; and (g) evasiveness regarding his knowledge of the towing policy. 
These are only a few examples of a very lengthy list of Huemiller's credibility 
problems. Furthermore, a hearing transcript is a poor substitute for observing and hearing 
the witness. Unlike this Court, the Commission saw and heard first hand Huemiller's 
pauses and flippancy, his denials, and his absurd attempts to "argue" there was no policy 
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or that he did not know the policy. 
In sum, this Court cannot reweigh evidence, determine the credibility of 
conflicting evidence or inferences to be drawn therefrom, and most importantly, "defers 
to the Commission on issues of credibility." This entire case hinges on credibility, and 
the Commission specifically found that Huemiller was not a credible witness and that he 
misrepresented the truth. Accordingly, this Court should summarily affirm the 
Commission's factual findings. 
IV, THE COMMISSION'S FACTUAL FINDINGS MUST BE AFFIRMED 
UNDER THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD 
The appellate court reviews "the final decision of the Commission only 'for the 
purpose of determining if the commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its 
authority.'" Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civ. Serv. Comm % 2000 UT App. 235, If 15, 8 P.3d 
1048. "'Discretion may be best viewed as an arena bounded by the law, within which the 
[Commission] may exercise its judgment as it sees fit.'" Id. (citation omitted). With 
regard to factual findings, a civil service commission's task is only to determine "whether 
the facts support the charges made by the department head." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758; see 
also Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, f 16, 8 P.3d 1048. A commission's findings then are 
reviewed on appeal under a "substantial evidence" standard, and in light of the entire 
record. Id. Substantial evidence " is that quantum and quantity of relevant evidence that 
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 
758. The appellate court does not "review the Commission's findings de novo or reweigh 
the evidence," and "defers to the Commission's findings on issues of credibility." Id. 
The appellate court employs a clearly erroneous standard in assessing whether to overturn 
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a Commission's factual findings. Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, f 15, 8 P.3d 1048. 
Based on these standards, the Commission's factual findings should be affirmed. 
A. THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT HUEMILLER MADE 
MISREPRESENTATIONS IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
1. The Evidence Supports The Commission's Finding That 
Huemiller Lied In His IA Interviews 
The Court should reject Huemiller's argument that there is not substantial evidence 
to show that he lied in either the 2000 or 1996 IAs. The reality is that his argument here 
is reminiscent of the parsing criticized by the Commission in its Decision. The issue with 
regard to Huemiller's lying is credibility: did the Commission believe that Huemiller was 
telling the truth or that witnesses against him were telling the truth? Huemiller limits his 
argument to the bare bones of the Greenwood Report of the 1996 IA as compared to the 
transcript of his interview with Lt. Stubbs in the 2000 IA. Huemiller's analysis is, 
however, misleading and overly narrow with regard to the record, and ignores the 
testimony of Chief Greenwood and Lt. Stubbs. 
Huemiller admitted at the hearing that before the Greenwood investigation he 
would recommend OAB to vehicle owners who had no preference, and then write it down 
as an OAB preference tow.20 He admitted the same thing to Lt. Stubbs during his 
interview in 2000, and also told Lt. Stubbs that he had "called Ogden Auto Body," and 
that it was "easy to talk people into requesting [OAB]." See OCPD Facts 47-48, 50, 64. 
This testimony is directly contradicted by what he told Chief Greenwood in 1996. 
20This testimony is also inconsistent with his admission at the hearing that he told 
Chief Greenwood in 1996 that he had "never directed tows out of the procedure, the way 
we do it, for Ogden Auto Body." 
63 
Chief Greenwood testified that recommending a wrecker to a no-preference vehicle 
owner would be directing tows and would be a violation of OCPD policy, and he testified 
that one of the purposes of his interviews in 1996 was to determine whether OAB was 
being "recommended" or business was being "solicited, and that Huemiller never told 
him he was doing that. He further testified that before the interview with Huemiller, he 
made sure that Huemiller knew what he meant by "circumventing" Wrecker Dispatch, 
and he testified that Huemiller "denied any—any implication whatsoever in soliciting 
business, calling wreckers or recommending tows." Huemiller told Chief Greenwood he 
had not directed tows to OAB, did not know of anyone who had, and understood he was 
not supposed to and had not. Finally, Chief Greenwood testified that, during the 
interview, Huemiller "went on to say that he hadn't encouraged or directed anybody to 
ask." OCPD Facts 92-102. Thus, Huemiller's statements to Chief Greenwood and Lt. 
Stubbs are contradictory and he was lying to one or the other, or both. 
Huemiller's admissions to Lt. Stubbs in the 2000 IA are also inconsistent with the 
representations made to Chief Greiner during the predetermination hearing, where 
Huemiller agreed with his attorney's statement that "what Tony is saying . . . is that 
whether it's an official policy, whether it's a memo, whether it's expired or whatever, 
he's not violated the procedure set forth in that memo." OCPD Fact 118. 
To the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence, as discussed in detail below, that 
Huemiller violated the towing policy from at least 1995-2000. including (a) the 
statements of Zaugg and VanBeekum who, finding themselves in the position of having 
to testify that Huemiller directed tows or risk perjury, refused to appear at the hearing; (b) 
the testimony of Brady, Mills and Lucero that Huemiller directed tows; (c) the statements 
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of Clair Baur and Hunt, and the proffer of testimony of Young, all of whom provided 
evidence that Huemiller was directing tows; (d) the adverse inference that can be made 
from Tom Baur's invoking the fifth amendment and refusing to testify; (e) the evidence 
that Huemiller violated the towing policy in his handling of the 29 & Madison incident 
and the SR 79 accident; (f) and the fact that Ms. Ortega's accident report analysis, while 
grossly understating the number of accidents in which Huemiller had involvement, 
establishes that most of the dispatches on Huemiller's accidents went to OAB. 
Moreover, Lt. Stubbs, Lt. Watts and Chief Greiner all testified that Huemiller had 
lied to them when he denied directing tows to OAB. Finally, in the hearing, Huemiller 
tried to evade the issue of whether he knew the towing procedure by stating: (a) "at this 
time" he could not remember whether he was trained on it during field training or 
whether there was a policy or procedure; (b) "at this time" he did not remember" whether 
he was "trained at all" on towing procedure; (c) that "to his recollection" he never "wrote 
down" OAB when it was a no-preference tow. OCPD Facts 48, 50. 
In light of the foregoing, this Court should conclude that the Commission's finding 
was not clearly erroneous. Any reasonable person could find from the foregoing that 
Huemiller lied to Chief Greenwood, Lt. Stubbs, and/or Chief Greiner. 
2. The Commission Properly Found That Huemiller Lied about the 
29th & Madison Incident 
The Commission did not err in finding that Huemiller lied about the incident at 
29th & Madison. The issue again is Huemiller's credibility as opposed to the credibility 
of numerous other witnesses and the evidence in the record as a whole. Just as in the 
hearing, Huemiller attempts to excuse the fact that he called OAB by contending that he 
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did not know he was violating OCPD policies by calling OAB directly, and that he 
thought it was a drug seizure. However, the record below provides substantial evidence 
in support of the Commission's findings. 
First, Huemiller argues that he was a member of the Strike Force until about 
December of 1999, and, therefore, he did not work traffic accidents, was unfamiliar with 
the towing policy, and that the accident was a proper drug seizure. These arguments are 
without merit based on the entire record below. First, Mills and Lt. Stubbs both testified 
that Huemiller worked overtime in uniform as an officer and showed up at accidents even 
when he was on the Strike Force. See n. 18, supra. Huemiller himself admitted at the 
hearing that when he worked the graveyard shift as a Sergeant and a Patrol Officer in the 
Uniform Division, he handled traffic accidents, and also dealt with non-drug tows when 
he was in the Strike Force. OCPD Fact 1. He also admitted that he knew that all tow 
calls should go through Wrecker Dispatch so that proper documentation could be made. 
OCPD Fact 44. In addition, Valdez (Huemiller's witness) admitted that in the OCPD all 
towing calls were to go through Wrecker Dispatch. OCPD Fact 42. 
Furthermore, Chief Greiner, a member of the governing body of the Strike Force, 
testified that the policy of the Strike Force is that vehicles are not seized where only drug 
paraphernalia is found in the vehicle, and that the Strike Force is not authorized to make 
seizures based only on paraphernalia. OCPD Fact 78. No drugs or paraphernalia were 
found in the vehicle at 29th & Madison, and the Impound Form does not have the 
requisite "DRUG SEIZURE" or "DRUGS" written across the top. OCPD Fact 79. 
Moreover, Mills, the officer who conducted the search of the driver and who found 
the marijuana pipe, testified at the hearing that he did not tell Huemiller he had found the 
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pipe, yet he heard Huemiller on his cellphone saying "Tom, come and get this car" while 
Mills was still conducting the search.21 OCPD Fact 75. Mills, who approached Lt. 
Stubbs and asked to be interviewed, testified at the hearing that it was improper for 
Huemiller to call a wrecker directly and that he should have gone through Wrecker 
Dispatch. OCPD Facts 60, 75. Mills also testified that he had seen Huemiller at least ten 
times at accident scenes calling on his cellphone, and then OAB would show up without it 
being radioed to Wrecker Dispatch. OCPD Fact 60. Equally disturbing was Huemiller 
testimony that he reached in his car and just happened to grab the OAB cellphone and not 
the OCPD cellphone, which is not credible given the fact that the relevant cellphone 
records demonstrate that Huemiller made zero calls to OAB on his OCPD cellphone and 
that he called Tom Baur from the cellphone numerous times in the early morning hours. 
OCPD Fact 73. 
Most important, Huemiller5 s lack of credibility is evidenced by his inconsistent 
testimony regarding the 29th & Madison incident. He told Lt. Stubbs during the IA that 
he concluded it was a drug seizure because he was told that by the other two officers 
(Mills and Hunt). OCPD Fact 105. At the hearing, however, Mills testified that he never 
told Huemiller it was a drug seizure, that Huemiller was already making the call directly 
to OAB on Huemiller's cellphone while Mills was still searching the suspect, and that 
Mills did not believe that it was a proper drug seizure. OCPD Fact 103. In response to 
this testimony, Huemiller changed his testimony at the hearing and claimed that he made 
the determination that it was a drug seizure when he saw Mills find a pipe as he was 
2huemiller complains that Hunt did not testify at the hearing (Aplt's Brf, p. 12), 
but Huemiller did not name Hunt as a witness and never asked OCPD to produce him. 
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searching the suspect. Id. Thus, the Commission's finding regarding the 29th & Madison 
incident was not clearly erroneous. 
3. The Hearing Established That Huemiller Lied About Other 
Matters 
There are several other examples from the record that support the Commission's 
finding that Huemiller misrepresented the truth. Huemiller lied to the Commission when 
he claimed that he had registered the Geo Tracker and not driven it for months on OAB 
dealer plates. OCPD Facts 7-11. He testimony regarding the SR 79 accident 
demonstrated a lack of credibility, including:(a) his testimony regarding all the things he 
did during the six to nine minute interval between his arrival and his request to dispatch 
OAB to the accident; (b) his denial that he recommended OAB to Armando, which was 
contradicted by Armando's statement that it was Huemiller who made this 
recommendation; and (c) his belated explanation that it was Bulmaro who requested OAB 
be dispatched, even though Bulmaro had previously denied doing so in an interview with 
OCPD's attorneys. See OCPD Facts 79-89. 
In addition, his testimony lacked credibility regarding why he obtained and how he 
used the OAB cellphone, including (a) his claim that he obtained it from OAB so as not to 
impact his credit rating even though he obtained a car loan during the same time frame 
and the evidence established that an officer does not have to fill out a credit application to 
obtain an OCPD cellphone; (b) his claim that he used it only rarely and for long calls 
when the cellphone records showed 159 calls most of which were only for a minute; (c) 
his claim that he grabbed whatever phone was available to call OAB, yet a comparison of 
his OCPD and OAB cellphone records demonstrates that that there were no calls to OAB 
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or Tom Baur on his OCPD cellphone; and (d) the fact that the OAB cellphone records 
demonstrated that he called Tom Baur at late hours, and then responded that "anyone" 
could have been calling from his cellphone in the wee hours. OCPD Facts 17-24. 
B. Huemiller Violated The Towing Policy 
For the same reasons, the Court should reject Huemiller's contention that there 
was not substantial evidence that he violated policy by recommending, persuading, or 
influencing citizens to use OAB. Huemiller admitted at the hearing that before the 
Greenwood investigation he would recommend OAB to vehicle owners who had no 
preference, and then write it down as an OAB preference tow. OCPD Fact 102. He also 
admitted during his interview with Lt. Stubbs that he had "called Ogden Auto Body," and 
that it was "easy to talk people into requesting." R. 3031. Significantly, with regard to 
later dates, when he was asked at the hearing whether he had ever called "OAB or any 
other wrecker unless a citizen requested [it]," he said that he could not answer that 
question because he did not know. OCPD Facts 48, 50. 
The evidence that Huemiller violated the towing policy from at least 1995-2000 
was overwhelming. Doug Lucero testified that after the Greenwood Investigation, 
Huemiller asked him to do what he could to send tows to OAB. OCPD Fact 68. Mills 
testified that, on at least ten occasions, he had seen Huemiller on his cellphone and OAB 
would then show up without anyone calling Wrecker Dispatch. OCPD Fact 60. Brady 
testified that both he and Huemiller directed tows. OCPD Fact 66. Zaugg and 
VanBeekum said Huemiller was directing tows to OAB. OCPD Facts 57, 59. Clair Baur 
of OAB admitted that Huemiller was "probably" involved in directing tows. OCPD Fact 
61. During the 1996 investigation, OCPD cellphone records were examined for calls to 
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OAB, and in early 2000 Huemiller (like Zaugg and VanBeekum) obtained a cellphone 
from Tom Baur and then used it as the exclusive cellphone used to call OAB or Tom 
Baur. OCPD Facb, 12, 15-18. Mills' testimony regarding the 29th & Madison incident 
showed that Huemiller was calling OAB before he even could have known of the 
paraphernalia. OCPD Fact 75. In addition, there is the adverse inference that can be 
made from Tom Baur's invoking the fifth amendment and refusing to testify. Also, the 
manner in which Huemiller handled the29 & Madison incident and the SR 79 accident 
demonstrates that he violated towing policy. 
Also, the "Huemiller-Officer Statistical Report," prepared by Ms. Ortega for the 
purpose of showing that Huemiller did not prefer OAB, actually backfired when the 
evidence established that, even though the report grossly understated the number of 
accidents involving Huemiller, four of the six tows shown for 2000 were to OAB and, of 
the limited number of accidents shown, OAB and its affiliates were dispatched more than 
any other towing company. See n. 18, supra. 
Based on these facts, any reasonable person could find that there was evidence 
which if believed, was sufficient to support this charge. 
C, Huemiller Had a Conflict of Interest 
There is also substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that 
Huemiller had a conflict of interest. The Huemillers drove a Geo Tracker for several 
months without purchasing it or having it registered. They also drove a Nissan, and 
Huemiller got a finders fee for selling OAB cars. OCPD Facts 4-11. Huemiller also 
received an OAB cellphone and did not pay for it until he was under internal 
investigation. OCPD Fact 18. This is significant, since Zaugg and VanBeekum also 
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received cellphones they did not pay for, both said that Huemiller was directing tows, and 
Zaugg admitted he never paid for the cellphone and that Tom Baur gave it to him so that 
he could call OAB directly for tows. OCPD Facts 12, 57, 59. Huemiller also took a trip 
to Laguna Seca based on his relationship with OAB and testified that he had some plans 
to work with Tom Baur at OAB after he retired from police work, which is significant 
since Tom Baur refused to testify about his relationship with Huemiller unless granted 
immunity from prosecution. OCPD Facts 12-18. In short, there is substantial evidence of 
a history of favors being exchanged. 
D. The Commission Properly Found That Huemiller Exhibited Conduct 
Unbecoming an Officer 
Huemiller's contention that his call to McGregor was a joke, and that he did not 
technically violate Lt. Stubbs' direct order not to "discuss the case" with anyone, reflects 
the same parsing that caused the Commission to find that he was not a credible witness. 
The exchange between Huemiller and Lt. Stubbs made very clear that Huemiller was to 
keep his mouth closed about the "case": 
Stubbs: OK. Oh, I do have to give an order. You are not allowed, 
you are ordered not to discuss this case with anyone short of 
your attorney obviously, if you get one. 
Huemiller: I'm going to discuss it with my wife. 
Stubbs: You know what I'm talking about. 
Huemiller: Right. 
R. 1520. 
Despite this, Huemiller called McGregor's home and left a message on his 
answering machine saying "you son of a bitch you better call me up or I'm going to kick 
your ass." OCPD Fact 128. When McGregor called Huemiller, the conversation went as 
follows: 
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I says, what's up? He says all that you, you gave me up. And I says, what 
do you mean? He says, I went and had an interview. I'm suspended. And 
they told me that you gave me up. I says, well believe what you have to 
believe.... 
Id. Huemiller also called McGregor a "fucking rat," and said "you turned on me." Id. 
Id. McGregor testified at the hearing that he could tell that Huemiller was mad at him, 
and that he knew that Huemiller had received a direct order not to talk to anyone about 
the investigation and he told Huemiller they should not be talking about the investigation. 
OCPD Fact 129. 
Despite Huemiller's contentions, his conversations with McGregor constitute 
"discussing" the case contrary to Lt. Stubbs' order. McGregor certainly recognized it was 
a violation, and the Commission did not err in finding that Huemiller disobeyed an order. 
V. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE 
TERMINATION22 
Huemiller contends that even if there was substantial evidence to support the facts, 
the sanction of termination was "abusively harsh" for "an exemplary and highly decorated 
seventeen-year police officer." Aplt's Brf., pp. 18, 23. This argument is without merit. 
"'In the typical challenge to agency action, the party challenging the action carries 
the burden of demonstrating its impropriety.'" Kelly, 2000 Utah App 235, ]f 30, 8 P.3d 
22Although the heading of Huemiller's argument on this issue states that "OCSC 
Fails to Address the Issue of Proper Sanction in its Decision," he never discusses this in 
his brief. Regardless, the Commission did address this issue when it found that "Chief 
Greiner's termination of Sergeant Anthony Huemiller's employment with Ogden City is 
affirmed." R. 1562. This is sufficient because Huemiller failed to even make out a prima 
facie case of inconsistency. The Kelly court recognized this when it rejected the 
employee's argument that the Commission was required to make specific findings 
regarding consistency of discipline. Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, f 34, 8 P.3d 1048. The 
court noted that this was unnecessary because the employee "failed to point to sufficiently 
similar episodes of conduct by other officers so as to trigger consistency analysis." Id. 
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1048 (quoting SEMECO Indus, v. State Tax Comm % 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) 
(Durham, J., dissenting)). In reaching its decision, the Ogden Civil Service Commission 
was bound to abide by the standard that "discipline imposed for employee misconduct is 
within the sound discretion of the Chief." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 761. "This discretion is 
abused [] if the punishment exceeds the range of sanctions permitted by statute or 
regulation, or if, in light of all the circumstances, the punishment is disproportionate to 
the offense." Id. The burden accordingly is on Huemiller "to establish a prima facie case 
that the Chief acted inconsistently in imposing sanctions by presenting sufficient evidence 
from which the Commission could reasonably find a relative inconsistency." Kelly, 2000 
Utah App 235, \ 30, 8 P.3d 1048. At a minimum, the employee bears "the burden of 
showing some meaningful disparity of treatment between [himself] and other similarly 
situated employee." Id. To do this, Huemiller must show that Chief Greiner's actions in 
his case "were contrary to his prior practice." Id. \ 27. The OCPD "does 'not carry the 
burden of persuasion as to the existence of a disparity,' rather the burden to show the 
existence of disparity" remains with Huemiller. Id. f 33 (citation omitted). 
Based on these standards, Huemiller's termination was appropriate under the 
circumstances and record, and Chief Greiner did not abuse his discretion. First, the fact 
that Zaugg and VanBeekum were also terminated for violating the towing policy and 
using OAB cellphones to direct tows, ends the analysis. In fact, the termination of 
Huemiller has even greater justification because: (1) as a Sergeant, he outranked Zaugg 
and VanBeekum; and (2) unlike Zaugg and VanBeekum, who admitted violating the 
towing policy, Huemiller committed a more serious offense by lying about his 
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misconduct. 
Second, Huemiller has failed to point to another officer who lied in an IA and was 
not terminated, or even to anyone who was similarly situated to him (except Zaugg and 
VanBeekum). Huemiller also should be estopped from contending that termination was 
an inconsistent discipline, since he objected to OCPD's introducing evidence of officers 
who were terminated during Chief Greiner's tenure for lying in an administrative 
proceeding. See R. 3409-3412. Huemiller had the burden to show disparity, and his 
objection24 to OCPD's producing this evidence of consistency of discipline (which was 
not OCPD's burden) should estop him from contending otherwise. 
Third, although he was not allowed to give details due to Huemiller's objection, 
Chief Greiner did testify that he had terminated "three or four" officers as the result of 
their lying in an I A. R. 3412. OCPD Fact 131. Chief Greiner was also allowed to give 
the name of one former officer who was terminated before his tenure, which showed that 
OCPD has a long-time policy of terminating employees who lie in an IA. R. 3412-13. 
23As Lt. Watt testified, the Chief and sergeants are the two most important 
members of a police force, since the sergeant is responsible for leading the troops and 
must be credible and serve as an example. OCPD Fact 124. 
24Inexplicably, the Commission sustained this objection. See R. 3412. The 
evidence was clearly relevant and the only possible explanation for excluding the 
evidence is that the Commission's attorney was not in attendance on that hearing day and 
none of the Commissioners were lawyers or had legal experience. The grounds for 
Huemiller's objection were frivolous. Huemiller's counsel contended that OCPD had not 
given him the names of terminated employees, which was false. As shown in Exhibits B-
D of OCPD Adden., the disciplined officers were assigned numbers, and Huemiller was 
allowed to go through the unredacted disciplinary files and review the disciplines and 
circumstances of discipline, and select those that he wanted copied. Huemiller's counsel 
therefore knew the names of all the disciplined officers, and he agreed that the names and 
identifying information could be redacted. See Exs. B-D, OCPD Adden. 
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The named officer was a Sergeant who was terminated for lying during an IA by stating 
that damage to his police car was caused by a hit and run, when he actually had backed 
into a pole. OCPD Fact 132. If it is appropriate to terminate a Sergeant whose only 
offense was lying in an IA about backing into a pole, it is certainly consistent to terminate 
Huemiller for lying, particularly since the additional charges against him are substantial. 
Fourth, none of the officers named by Huemiller are similarly situated to him with 
regard to the number of previous disciplines they have received. Huemiller admitted to 
eight previous disciplines: (a) failing to show up/being tardy for court appearances; (b) 
letting a civilian (Tom Baur) ride in his police car; (c) violation of police pursuit driving; 
(d) hitting a suspect in the head with a police pistol and failing to include it in the police 
report; (e) overstating hours on his time card; (f) speeding in a police vehicle; (g) fighting 
in public; (h) failing to report that another police officer had slapped a suspect. OCPD 
Fact 2; see also OCPD Resp. To Aplt.'s Facts, *[ffl 56-64, supra. In fact, Huemiller was 
the standard by which Chief Greiner determined how to discipline officers involved in a 
bar fight. R.3421. 
Fifth, none of the officers named by Huemiller are similarly situated to him with 
regard to type or number of offenses.25 Phillips did not receive free auto work. OAB did 
some insurance-paid paint repair for him after an accident, but Phillips turned the 
25Significantly, unlike Huemiller, none of these officers directed tows, was a 
Sergeant, had a free OAB cellphone, lied in an IA, received a finders' fee from OAB, 
called Tom Baur on an OAB cellphone in the middle of the night and then testified that 
"it could have been anyone" making the call, received a trip to Laguna Seca, lied about 
registering an OAB vehicle they had not registered, were identified by a citizen who 
signed a witness statement as recommending OAB to tow a vehicle, violated a direct 
order and left a message for another officer called him a "fucking rat" and snitch, or had 
plans to work with Tom Baur after retiring from police work. 
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insurance check over to OAB and Tom Baur told him the insurance money had covered 
everything. Phillips also did not try to influence citizens to use one wrecker company, 
but instead gave them a couple of unrelated names. Unlike Huemiller, Mills did not direct 
tows to OAB, and allowed OAB to take a vehicle only once without going through 
Wrecker Dispatch in a situation where an accident was blocking the intersection and 
OAB was already there on a drug seizure. Mills also tried to give OAB money for the oil 
change but they refused to take it, and he had paid for all prior work on his vehicle. OAB 
refused to accept pay from Lucero for work done despite two attempts by Lucero to pay 
for the work. Felter never directed tows and he did receive a letter of caution. Finally, 
Croyle was driving the Nissan while attempting to buy it and get it registered. See OCPD 
Resp. To Aplt.'s Facts, fflf 56-64, supra. 
Sixth, the testimony of every higher-ranking former or present OCPD officer 
who was asked, confirms that termination was the proper action. Former OCPD Chief 
Greenwood testified that "unequivocally officers can never lie, if they do they have no 
credibility in police work." OCPD Fact 122. Lt. Watt testified that "[a]n officer's 
veracity can never be doubted," and that a sergeant "leads the troops" and shapes, guides, 
directs and mentors them, and is responsible for their careers, and must be know to be 
trustworthy when he sits in court and raises his hand to swear the truth. OCPD Fact 124. 
Chief Greiner testified that he felt Huemiller's termination was justified because he could 
not afford to have a major criminal case dismissed because the officer on the stand has 
engaged in administrative dishonesty with the "first question out of the defense attorney's 
mouth being 'have you ever lied in an administrative investigation, what makes this jury 
believe that you won't lie here today?'" OCPD Facts 125-26. Even Gary Heward, 
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Huemiller's character witness and a Deputy Weber County Attorney, testified that he is 
ethically bound not to use an officer as a witness if he does not believe the officer will 
testify truthfully. OCPD Fact 123. 
Finally, all of the foregoing proves that termination was proportionate to the 
offense and not inconsistent with other disciplines. The Commission accordingly did not 
err when it affirmed his discipline of termination. 
VI. THE COMMISSION HEARING WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO 
HUEMILLER NOR DID IT VIOLATE HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Huemiller contends that the Commission hearing was prejudicial to him and 
violated his constitutional rights because: (a) the Commission's Rule 10-6 required him to 
disprove the charges against him (Aplt's Brf., p. 31); (b) OCPD allegedly withheld 
information from him prior to the Commission hearing; (c) requiring him to present 
evidence first at the hearing shifted the burden to him and allowed OCPD to change its 
reasons for his termination; (d) placing the burden of proof on the employee is 
"antithetical" to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012(1), which requires "cause" for termination; 
(e) placing the burden of proof on the employee "casts" the employee as a wrongdoer 
from the beginning; (f) placing the burden of proof on Huemiller is contrary to what other 
Utah civil service commissions or the State of Utah do; (g) the procedure violates his due 
process rights. The Court should reject these arguments. 
A. OCPD Produced Requested Documents and Things and Huemiller Was 
Not Prejudiced, 
Huemiller's statement that OCPD withheld evidence is without merit. As a 
preliminary matter, Chief Greiner provided all the allegations to Huemiller during the 
predetermination hearing, but Huemiller knowingly refused to ask questions or provide 
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explanations. Furthermore, prior to the hearing before the Commission, OCPD provided 
Huemiller with over 1200 pages of documents. OCPD first provided the over 400 pages 
comprising the binder containing the IA of Sgt. Huemiller, VanBeekum, and Zaugg, 
including interview summaries, police reports, witness statements, summaries and every 
other piece of information reviewed by Chief Greiner. See R. 63. Although the binder 
was not tabbed, a tabbed binder was provided to Huemiller during the hearing and he was 
given time to review it. Significantly, Huemiller did not allege in the hearing that he 
would have done anything differently if he had had the tabbed binder prior to the hearing. 
The Commission also allowed Huemiller to send document requests and 
interrogatories to OCPD, which he did. See 21-33, 72-78. Huemiller's discovery 
requests are extensive and include requests for: (a) written details and explanations for 
each category of reasons under which Huemiller was charged {see R. 25-28); (b) 
interview transcripts (not tape-recordings) {see R. 29-30); (c) all paperwork on certain 
cases (R. 29-30); (d) all documents related to each Interrogatory question and/or answer 
(R. 30-33); (e) copies of all computer records showing "all accidents in which Huemiller" 
was assigned as an officer, or was at the accident site (R. 31); (f) names and 
documentation of officers terminated, suspended or who received any discipline greater 
than a verbal warning during Chief Greiner's tenure. R. 75-78. 
OCPD complied with all of these requests,26 including producing more than 1200 
page of documents (not counting those where Huemiller was simply given access to 
26Moreover, OCPD could not produce documents that it did not have or that 
belonged to another investigative agency or person, e.g., Wrecker Dispatch or Weber 
County, and so notified Huemiller. R. 67. 
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computerized records and copied what he wished), and as well as twenty-seven pages of 
answers to Huemiller's seventeen interrogatories. SeeR. 125-152. OCPD's interrogatory 
responses gave explicit details of the evidence against Huemiller as well as the reasons 
for Chief Greiner's action of termination. See id. 
Contrary to Huemiller's complaint to this Court, he never requested the tapes of 
interviews with the exception of the tape of his own interview, which was provided to 
him. See Ex. E to OCPD Adden. OCPD also produced (without requiring a subpoena) 
every OCPD witness requested by Huemiller, and complied with Huemiller's numerous 
written requests for documents, including documents that had already been sent to him 
previously. See id. Although Huemiller complains that Officer Michael Hunt was not at 
the hearing, Huemiller failed to request that OCPD produce him as a witness. See id. 
In compliance with Huemiller's request and the Commission's Order, OCPD also 
permitted Huemiller's attorneys to review the unredacted disciplinary files of other 
officers disciplined by Chief Greiner. See R. 158-178, 188, 190-95, 3409-3411; see also 
Exs. B, C, D to OCPD Addend.; R. 155. Huemiller's attorneys identified the disciplinary 
files they wanted to have copied, and specifically agreed to the redaction of names and 
personal information from the copies produced. See Exs. B, E to OCPD Adden. 
The reality is that OCPD went to the great lengths to provide everything requested 
by Huemiller.27 In light of this, Huemiller has not shown how he was harmed if the 
27In return, OCPD requested nothing from Huemiller since it felt bound to rely on 
the information possessed by Chief Greiner when he made the decision to terminate. 
Moreover, if OCPD had requested documents, it would have requested the Order on 
Huemiller's unemployment appeal, which showed that he told the ALJ in that hearing a 
different story than he told the Commission. 
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documents he alleges were not produced, had been produced. 
In sum, OCPD produced documents and explanations to comply with Huemiller's 
every whim, including documents it had already produced. For Huemiller now to allege 
that "it was impossible for Huemiller to understand, going into the hearing" the specific 
issues, is disingenuous. 
B. Commission Rule 10-6 Is Consistent With Utah Law. 
Commission Rule 10-6 does not require Huemiller to "disprove the charges against 
him," and is completely consistent with Utah law. Rule 10-6 states: 
The procedure at the hearing shall require that the appellant first establish 
the grounds on which he or she relies to disprove the action taken by 
the appointing authority which he or she considers creates the adverse 
affects [sic]. 
OCSC R. 10-6. Requiring an employee to disprove the "action" of the Chief is consistent 
with Lucas, Kelly and other cases which state the employee has the burden to show that 
the discipline imposed is inconsistent or disproportionate. In fact, Kelly specifically states 
that "'[i]n the typical challenge to agency action, the party challenging the action carries 
the burden of demonstrating its impropriety.'" Kelly, 2000 Utah App 235, f 30, 8 P.3d 
1048 (emphasis added) (quoting SEMECO Indus, v. State Tax Comm Vi, 849 P.2d 1167, 
1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting)). The burden accordingly is on Huemiller "to 
establish a prima facie case that the Chief acted inconsistently in imposing sanctions by 
28The only documents not produced were some notes belonging to Croyle and 
some notes belonging to Lt. Stubbs, which were given to Huemiller during the hearing 
and which he had time and opportunity to review at that time. His counsel was also given 
the opportunity to examine Croyle and Lt. Stubbs regarding these notes. If the notes had 
been of any substance or any different than what Huemiller had already received or knew 
about, his counsel would have raised the issue in the hearing, and he did not. 
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presenting sufficient evidence from which the Commission could reasonably find a 
relative inconsistency" {Kelly, 2000 Utah App 235, f 30, 8 P.3d 1048), and at a minimum, 
Huemiller bears "the burden of showing some meaningful disparity of treatment between 
[himself] and other similarly situated employee." Id. Moreover, the agency "does 'not 
carry the burden of persuasion as to the existence of a disparity,' rather the burden to 
show the existence of disparity" remains with Huemiller. Id. \ 33 (citation omitted). 
Thus, the relevant language of Rule 10-6 complies with this Court's directions. 
C. The Fact That Huemiller Went First At The Hearing Did Not Place 
The Burden of Proof on Him As To Factual Issues 
Nor did Huemiller's presenting his case first at his appeal to the Commission place 
the burden of proof on him with regard to factual issues. Not only is there no evidence 
that the burden of proof was placed on Huemiller, the reality is that the Commission 
simply heard all of the evidence and witnesses, allowed both parties to present virtually 
all evidence and witnesses that they wished to present, allowed both parties to give 
opening and closing statements, and then made its decision based on all of this. See Hrg. 
Trans., passim. As discussed above, OCPD produced everything Huemiller requested. 
He also examined and cross-examined witnesses and introduced exhibits. By going first, 
Huemiller had the significant advantage of having the first and last word at the hearing. 
Furthermore, Huemiller did not have to "prove" anything except that the action of 
termination was inconsistent and disproportional. OCPD put on its case through 
examining witnesses and presenting exhibits, and pointed out areas where there were 
credibility problems and where Huemiller was lying. This does not amount to placing the 
burden of proof on Huemiller. As the evidence marshaled by OCPD shows, the evidence 
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of wrongdoing by Huemiller was not just "substantial," it was overwhelming. 
Huemiller's statement that Rule 10-6 "effectively says that an employee is guilty 
unless proven innocent," is also incorrect. What Rule 10-6 says is that Huemiller must 
disprove the "action" taken against him, i.e., show that the termination was excessive or 
inconsistent, which is exactly what this Court requires, as discussed above.- It is 
disingenuous for Huemiller to contend that OCPD "changed the focus" of the case from 
towing violations to lying, because both grounds were identified as reasons for the 
termination and OCPD made it clear from the beginning that its "case" was centered on 
his lying. In fact, his first interrogatory to OCPD acknowledges this when it asks: 
In Chief Greiner's termination letter to Sergeant Huemiller dated May 15, 
2000, . . . he makes the following statement: "including a Garrity interview 
with you which revealed apparent misrepresentations of the truth." Please 
detail all apparent misrepresentations of the truth which you contend that 
Huemiller made in the Garrity interviews and why you contend this 
constitutes misrepresentation.. .. 
R. 126. In response, OCPD provided over seven pages of specific details of Huemiller's 
misrepresentations, and why they were misrepresentations. See R. 126-133. 
D. Placing the Burden of Proof on an Employee in Post-Termination 
Proceedings Does Not Violate Due Process 
Even if the Commission had placed the burden of proof on Huemiller with regard 
to the charges against him, which it did not, there would be no violation of due process. 
In Benavidez v. City of Albuquerque, 101 F.3d 620 (10th Cir. 1996),29 the Tenth Circuit 
29See also, Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976) ("Outside the criminal law 
area, where special concerns attend, the locus of the burden of persuasion is normally not 
an issue of federal constitutional moment."); Rutherford v. City of Albuquerque, 11 F.3d 
1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 1996) (placing burden of proof on employee does not necessarily 
violate due process). 
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held that it did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process to place the burden of 
proof on employees in OCPD hearings where those employees could be represented by 
counsel, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 625-27 (rejecting Soles v. 
City of Raleigh Civil Serv. Comm n,30 119 N.C. App. 88, 457 S.E.2d 746 (1995)). In 
rejecting the argument that placing this burden would violate due process, the Benavidez 
court examined the balancing factors in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), relied 
on by Huemiller. Benavidez, 101 F.3d at 626-27. The court noted that although the first 
factor (interest in retaining employment) weighs in favor of the employee's argument, the 
second and third factors did not because the OCPD procedures were adequate. Id. The 
court noted that OCPD procedures are more important when an employee has "little or no 
opportunity to present his side of the case." Id. at 626. As the court pointed out: 
when an employee has had a meaningful opportunity to explain his position 
and challenge his dismissal in pre-termination proceedings, the importance 
of the procedures in the post-termination hearing is not great. In this type 
of post-termination hearing, simply giving the employee "some 
opportunity" to present his side of the case "will provide a meaningful 
hedge against erroneous action." 
Id. (citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Louderrnill, 470 U.S. 532 at 543 n.8 (1995)). 
In this case, Huemiller had the opportunity to present his side of the case in the 
predetermination hearing, but refused to do so. He asked for and obtained a continuance 
of, and was represented by counsel in, the predetermination hearing, and John Valdez, a 
member of the police association, was also present. See R. 79-104 (Preterm. Hrg. Trans.). 
Moreover, the procedures in the Commission hearing were extensive, including allowing 
30Huemiller cites Soles and Townsel v. San Diego Metro Transit Dev 't Board, 65 
Cal. App. 4th 940 (Ca. App. 1998), to support his argument that it violates due process to 
place this burden on the employee. 
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discovery, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, introduction of exhibits, and 
virtually every safeguard that one would receive in a court trial. Huemiller also has the 
opportunity to appeal his termination to this Court, and has done so. 
With regard to the third Mathews factor (weighing OCPD's interest), OCPD has a 
strong interest in maintaining the credibility and integrity of its officers. This interest is 
equal, if not significantly more important, than any interest Huemiller may have in his 
position as a police officer. If a police department is viewed as being staffed by officers 
without credibility or honor, every citizen in the community suffers. Moreover, as the 
Benavidez court notes, "[i]t is also a 'common-sense realization that government offices 
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.'" Id. at 
627 (quoting National Treasury Employees Credit Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 
(1989) (quoting Connickv. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983))). 
In sum, though the burden of proof was not on Huemiller, even if it had been the 
procedure in the hearing was not prejudicial and did not deprive him of due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The OCPD respectfully asks this Court to affirm the Decision of the Commission, 
which in turn affirmed Chief Greiner's termination of Huemiller. The Commission 
properly found that there was substantial evidence to support the charges against 
Huemiller. Based on the charges, and consistent other discipline imposed by OCPD, 
termination was appropriate. Since Huemiller failed to marshal the evidence, the factual 
findings should also be affirmed The Commission's specific finding that Huemiller 
misrepresented the truth and lacked credibility during the hearing also warrants this 
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Court's affirming the facts and action of termination, since this Court defers to agencies 
on issues of credibility. Finally, neither the Commission's rules nor the procedure before 
or during the hearing prejudiced Huemiller or violated his due process rights. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Given the issues raised in this case, OCPD requests oral argument to assist the 
Court in fully understanding the issues and OCPD's position. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 2004. 
SNOW, CffltfSTENSE£r& M^RSINEAU 
Stanley J/P^eston 
CamilleQ^Johnson 
Judith D. Wolferts 
Attorneys for Ogden City Police Department 
N:\13607\459\AppelleeBrief04-19-04.wpd 
85 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l^t\j day of April, 2004,1 caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the BRIEF OF OGDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT to be mailed by first 
class United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Erik Strindberg 
Lauren I. Scholnick 
Ralph E. Chamness 
April Hollingsworth 
STRINDBERG & SCHOLNICK, LLC 
44 Exchange Place, 2d Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
Douglas Holmes 
274 1/2 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Ogden Civil Service Commission 
jston 
D. Wolferts 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 




A. Statutes and Rules of Central Importance 
Rule 10-6, Ogden City Civil Service Commission Rules & Regulations 
B. Letter from Judith Wolferts to Lauren Scholnick (July 17, 2001) 
C. Letter from Camille Johnson to Erik Strindberg (Apr. 25, 2001) 
D. Disciplinary Actions (Feb. 27, 2001) 




CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
TABLE OP CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1-- Definitions 
Chapter 2-- General Provisions and Prohibitions 
Chapter 3-- Commission 
Chapter 4-- Recruitment of Personnel to the Classified Service 
Chapter 5-- Selection of Personnel 
Chapter 6-- Appointment to the Classified Service 
Chapter 7-- Probationary Period 
Chapter 8-- Suspension, Reinstatement, Hearings and Appeal 
Chapter 9-- Review by Fire Chief or Police Chief 
Chapter 10-- Appeals to the Civil Service Commission 
Chapter 11-- Adoption and Amendment of Rules 
INTRODUCTION 
Utah State Law directs that all appointments and promotions in the 
classified service of the City shall be made subject to the rules 
and regulations of the Civil Service Commission. Classified 
service consists of all places of employment in the police and fire 
departments. 
It is also intended by these Rules to provide a working policy of 
personnel administration within which both the employees in the 
classified service and administrators can cooperate on a friendly 
basis with complete assurance that all personnel problems will be 
settled upon their merits and that all interested parties, 
including the public, will have just and equitable treatment. 
These Rules are authorized by Section 10-3-1006, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
CHAPTER 10 
APPEALS TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
1 0 - 1 Employee Appeals -- When Authorized 
Any regular classified employee may appeal to the Commission from 
any order of the appointing authority entered under these Rules by 
which the employee is suspended, reduced, demoted, dismissed, 
removed, or otherwise adversely affected, 
1 0 - 2 Applicants and Eligibles Appeals -- When Authorized 
Any applicant for examination and any eligible may appeal to the 
Commission from any final action enforcing these Rules by which he 
or she was adversely affected. 
1 0 - 3 How Taken -- Time 
Appeals as provided in the next preceding section shall be taken by 
filing with the secretary of the Commission a notice of appeal on 
the designated form for such appeal. Such notice of appeal must be 
served and filed within five (5) working days after service upon 
the appellant of the order appealed from, and if not served and 
filed within the time specified, the appeal shall be dismissed, 
1 0 - 4 Notice of Appeal 
The Notice of Appeal must be in writing and on the form provided 
for such, addressed to the Civil Service Commission. A copy of the 
appointing authority's findings and order may be attached thereto. 
The Notice shall show wherein it is contended the order adversely 
affects the appellant, and wherein it is contended the findings and 
order are erroneous. It must be signed by the appellant. 
1 0 - 5 Powers of Commission 
Subject to state law and for good cause shown upon written petition 
duly filed and served on the adverse party or on its own motion, 
the Commission may make such orders as it deems necessary, 
extending the time limited by these Rules within which any party 
shall be required to act, except the time to appeal, and may 
require or permit the setting of a hearing, the taking of 
depositions, the preservation of evidence, the subpoenaing of 
witnesses and such other matters or things as it deems necessary or 
desirable for the best interest of the parties, the public, and for 
the full hearing and determination of the matter. It may hold a 
pre-hearing conference to frame the issues to be tried and to 
explore the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact from either 
party, and if such conference is held, it shall enter an order 
stating the issues and any admissions or stipulations of fact. In 
framing the issues, it shall not be bound by the issues considered 
by the appointing authority in his or her findings and order, but 
may, in the interest of justice and when it deems such action to be 
for the good of the service, consider any relevant issues. The 
order may be amended from time to time on such terms as may be 
just. All matters before the Commission shall be decided by the 
preponderance of the evidence. 
1 0 - 6 Hearing -- Procedure 
The hearing of said matter shall be at a time, place, and day fixed 
by the Commission before at least a quorum of the Commission. The 
parties may appear in person and may be represented by counsel. 
The appellant is entitled to a public-hearing. 
The procedure at the hearing shall require that the appellant first 
establish the grounds on which he or she relies to disprove the 
action taken by the appointing authority which he or she considers 
creates the adverse affects. Following the appellant's case, the 
City may enter its rebuttal evidence. 
The Commission shall provide for a fair hearing and have sufficient 
reliable evidence upon which to justify any decision. 
The right of a classified employee to appeal adverse administrative 
action subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission 
is undisputed and the City shall not attempt to block a 
procedurally correct appeal. 
1 0 - 7 Reporting of or Recording of Proceedings 
Every hearing shall be recorded either by Certified Shorthand 
Reporter or by a mechanical or electronic recording device, as the 
Commission may determine. The recording of the transcript shall be 
preserved for five (5) years and shall not be opened for inspection 
except by order of the Commission or of a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
1 0 - 8 Evidence 
At all hearings the Commission shall determine the admissability of 
evidence and shall use as near as it deems practicable the rules of 
evidence following in the courts of Utah. Provided, however, 
hearsay evidence is admissible and its weight and sufficiency shall 
be determined by the Commission. 
1 0 - 9 Swearing of Witnesses 
Every witness at a hearing before the Commission shall first be 
sworn to testify truthfully as provided in Title 78, Chapter 24, 
Sections 16 to 19 inclusive of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 . The 
oath may be administered by a member of the Commission or by the 
Secretary of the Commission. 
10 - 10 Decision -- Scope of Order of Review 
The Commission shall fully hear and determine matters appealed to 
it and shall determine the factual questions involved. The 
Commission may affirm or reverse, wholly or partly, or may modify 
the order, requirement, decision, or determination appealed. 
The findings and decision of the Civil Service Commission upon such 
hearing shall be certified to the Chief of the Department, and 
shall be final, and shall forthwith be enforced and followed by the 
Chief of the Department. 
10 - 11 Grievances Outside Jurisdiction of Commission 
Any grievances outside the jurisdiction of the Commission alleged 
by classified employees shall be referred to the City to be 
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BLAND-DELIVERED 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr. Strindberg, 
AccompanyJGg this letter are documents that we are submitting to you in compliance with 
the Civil Service Commission's Order on your client's Renewed Motion to Compel. The 
documents submitted are bates-stamped 001117 to 001215, are stamped "confidential," and are 
submitted under the Stipulation of Confidentiality to which you have previously agreed. 
We were pleased to meet with Ms. Scholnick in Ogden on July 13, 2001, for the purpose 
of her reviewing the documents at issue and identifying all those which she wished to have copied. 
Ms. Scholnick expressly agreed at that time that by permitting her to review those documents, we 
were not waiving GRAMA issues and that those issues could be asserted. 
The following is a summary of the documents that Ms. Scholnick identified, and our 
explanations of the documents that are being submitted to you and those that are not being 
submitted. All documents contain a hand-written designation in the upper right-hand corner. 
This number identifies the officer/employee at issue, as listed on the chart previously produced to 
you. Officers/employees are identified as either "former" or "current," e.g., "Current # 5" or 
"Former # 7." We have already informed Ms. Scholnick of the employee/officer's position/rank. 
As a general comment, we have redacted the names of officers/employees who are the 
subject of the disciplinary action, and have also redacted all other names, including business 
names, as well as personal information such as addresses, telephone numbers, and social security 
numbers. This comports with Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d), which states that the following 
records may be designated as private: "other records containing data on individuals the disclosure 
of which constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and with Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-302(a)(f), which states that the following are private with regard to a current or 
former employee: "individual's home address, home telephone number, social security number, 
insurance coverage, marital status, or payroll deductions." This redaction will not prejudice your 
client's ability to identify similarly situated individuals. 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
July 17, 2001 
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CURRENT WPlQYffES 
(1) Nos. 5, 28, and 22 
These documents deal with one incident involving three officers. All documents are 
produced, and redacted as discussed above. 
(2) No. 6 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. They are also redacted 
with regard to an allegation where the officer was exonerated. By way of explanation, 
your Motion to Compel cites Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2)(o) as support for your 
position that the documents which you request are public. This section of GRAMA states 
that: 
(2) The following records are normally public, but to the extent a 
record is expressly exempt from disclosure, access may be 
restricted under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b), Section 63-2-302, 63-
2-303, or 63-2-304: 
(o) records that would disclose information relating to formal 
charges or disciplinary actions against a past or present 
governmental entity employee if: 
(i) the disciplinary action had been 
completed and all time periods for 
administrative appeal have expired; 
and 
(ii) the charges on which the 
disciplinary action was based were 
sustained. 
When an employee/officer is exonerated, there is no "disciplinary action" that was 
"completed." 
(3) No. 12 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. 
(4) No. 14 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. 
(5) No. 17 
Documents are redacted as discussed above. All documents are produced except the 
"Investigating Officer's Report of Traffic Accident," which is a private record under 
GRAMA. The are other reports of the accident which are submitted, and which provide 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
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any information needed. 
(6) No. 19 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. 
(7) No. 24 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. 
(8) No. 25 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. 
(9) No. 26 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. 
(10) No. 27 
Documents are redacted as discussed above, including the "false" name and address given 
by the officer. The "false" name and address were redacted because it is unclear whether 
there is someone of that name, address, or telephone number. We have not redacted the 
"false" name "Jeff." We have redacted insurance coverage information pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-302(l)(f) (insurance coverage information is private). All documents • 
are produced except the following: / / 
(a) Accident Reports obtained from another governmental agency. We believe 
we have no authority to disclose these, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
2-206. In general, these deal with how the accident occurred. The officer 
at issue was not involved in the accident. 
(b) Boating Accident Data obtained from another governmental agency. We 
believe we have no authority to disclose this, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-206. 
(c) Vehicle Registration display information obtained from another 
governmental agency. We believe we have no authority to disclose this, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-206. 
(d) Copies of scraps of paper whereon the false name, correct name, address, 
and insurance information were written. These disclose private information 
such as names and insurance coverage information. 
(e) Witness Statements obtained from another governmental agency. We 
believe we have no authority to disclose these, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-206. In general, these documents deal with descriptions by those 
involved in the accident of how the accident occurred. 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
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(11) No. 29 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. 
(12) No. 33 
All documents are produced, and redacted as discussed above. One document is redactec 
as to an "unsubstantiated" allegations. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2)(o), the 
information could not be public since there was no "disciplinary action" which was 
"completed." 
(13) No. 35 
All documents are produced, and redacted as to names. 
(14) No. 37 
All documents are produced, and redacted as to names and an address. 
(15) No. 39 
All documents are produced, and redacted as to names. 
(16) No. 44 
The documents are redacted to remove an allegation where the employee was exonerated. 
In light of the exoneration, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2)(o), the information 
could not be public since there was no "disciplinary action" which was "completed." In 
addition to the redaction of names, highly personal and private information has been 
redacted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d). The person to whom this highly 
personal and private information applies is not the officer at issue. 
(17) No. 45 
The documents are redacted to remove an allegation of which the officer was exonerated. 
In light of the exoneration, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2)(o), the information 
could not be public since there was no "disciplinary action" which was "completed." 
Names are redacted. 
FORMER EMPLOYEES 
(1) No. 2 
Documents are not produced. There was an internal affairs investigation, and the officer 
resigned. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2)(o), the information could not be public 
because there was no "disciplinary action" that was "completed." 
(2) No. 6 
All documents requested are produced, and names are redacted. 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
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(3) No, 7 
Names, personal information, addresses, and personal financial information are redacted, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(l)(f) & (2)(d). The following documents have 
not been produced: 
(a) A document which reflects a March 24, 1997 verbal warning. This does 
not fall within your discovery requests. 
(b) Case Reports obtained from another governmental agency which do not 
relate to the officer at issue, and which apply to other persons. These 
would be private under at least Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2). 
(c) An interview of the officer conducted by another governmental entity and 
obtained from that governmental entity. We believe we have no authority 
to disclose these, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-206. An interview of 
the officer under Garrity by Ogden City is provided, however, and this 
* * covers the same information. 
(4) No. 12 
Documents are not produced. There was an internal investigation and the officer resigned. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2)(o), the information could not be public because 
there was no "disciplinary action" which was "completed." 
Please feel free to contact us if you have questions, or would like to discuss this matter 
further. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
idith D. Wtflferts 
JDW/kp 
cc: Andy Blackburn (w/o end.) (by facsimile) 
Stanley J. Preston (w/o end.) 
Camille N. Johnson (w/o end.) 




SNOW, C H R I S T E N S E N & MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 0 0 0 
T E L E P H O N E (801) 5 2 1 - 9 0 0 0 
C A M I L L E N . J O H N S O N FACSIMILE (801)363-0400 WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER: 
(801) 322-9119 
April 25, 2001 
omnenuL 
Erik Strindberg 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Erik: 
My letter is in response to your request for additional information on the discipline, by 
Chief Greiner, of police department employees. Our original list provided to you on 
February 7 2001, is Bates-stamped 000853-60. I believe that the information provided on the 
offenses of current employees is sufficient. I do have additional information for you on the 
conduct of former employees. I refer to the following by the officer number identified on the 
list Bates-stamped 000858-60. None of these employees had supervisory responsibilities in the 
department. None held the rank of sergeant as did Mr. Huemiller. 
Employee No. 1: The offense giving rise to an Internal Affairs investigation was 
the filing of a false police report. 
Employee No. 2: An internal affairs investigation was undertaken of Employee 
No. 2 after the department received a citizen complaint of 
unprofessional conduct on the job. The employee was not 
truthful in the Internal Affairs investigation and, in fact, flunked 
a polygraph exam. 
Employee No. 5: Employee No. 5's conduct giving rise to the dismissal was 
reported through citizen complaints. Specifically, verbal abuse 
of children and failure to respond to calls in a timely way. This 
employee was already on probation for an incident of alleged 
sexual harassment. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Erik Strindberg 
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Employee No. 6: 
Employee No. 7: 
Employee No. 6 was dismissed for poor work performance and 
violation of department policy. Specifically, the officer was 
taking a police car places where it was not allowed during off-
duty time. 
Employee No. 7 was a sworn officer who was dismissed for 
performance problems. He later rejoined the City as a civilian 
employee in the police department. An Internal Affairs 
investigation was undertaken of the employee when his wife was 
apprehended for shoplifting, and it was determined the employee 
knew about it but did nothing to report it. Employee No. 7 also 
had violations of department policy for not keeping his vehicle 
clean. 
Employee No. 8: 
Employee No. 12: 
Employee No. 8 was a clerical employee. The Internal Affairs 
investigation giving rise to Employee No. 8's dismissal was for 
reviewing records on her ex-husband for use in a divorce 
proceeding, which records she was not authorized to have access 
to. The work performance issue was that the employee was 
hiding her work in a drawer and not performing it as assigned. 
Employee No. 12 resigned after an Internal Affairs investigation 
concerning his wife. His wife was receiving drugs in the mail 
from Mexico, which was illegal. The department investigated, 
and the officer was not truthful in the investigation. The officer 
said he did not know what his wife was doing, but the facts 
showed that he has used the police department phone to call 
Mexico. 
I have not provided you with the names of these officers as we believe that information 
is protected. Furthermore, the police union has asked that we not designate any officer by 
name but that we come up with some other system to identify them. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Erik Strindberg 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
April 25, 2001 
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I am marking my letter "confidential" and ask that the information contained herein be 
maintained confidential as per our stipulation. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
CNJ/cah 
cc: Andy Blackburn 
Stanley J. Preston 
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POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84U7-0Q08 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Roger G. Segal 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
David S. Dolowitz 
Vernon L. Hopkinson 
John T. Morgan 
Keith W. Meade 
Ray M. Beck 
A.O. Headman, Jr 
Julie A. Bryan 
Erik Strindberg 
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Brian F. Roberts 
Dena C. Sarandos 
Lauren I. Scholnick 
Lauren R. Barros 
Brent Gordon 
August 6, 2001 
Stan Preston FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
Judith Wolferts 363-0400 
Camille N. Johnson 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Ogden City v. Huemiller, re Witnesses 
Dear Troika: 
Stan indicated that you would cooperate and make arrangements to have police officers 
that are still with the Department available for testimony on Monday, August 13th. Could you 
please see that the following individuals are available on Monday Morning: 





If there is going to be any problem with having any of these individuals available please 
let us know immediately. 
Sincerely, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C 
Erik Strindberg 
cc: Tony Huemiller 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
tO EXCHANGE PLACE. ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84-14-5-5000 
TELEPHONE (80I) 521-9000 
C A M I L L E N. J O H N S O N FACSIMILE <soi> 363-OAOO WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER-
HTTP//WWW SCMLAW COM (801)328-9119 
E-MAIL ADDRESS. 
cJohnson©scmlaw com 
August 25, 2000 
Erik Strindberg 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Erik: 
I enclose some additional documents related to the City's decision to terminate Tony 
Huemiller. They are: 
1. Transcript of the Predetermination Hearing on May 11, 2000; 
2. May 4, 2000 letter from Chief Greiner to Tony Huemiller; 
3. May 15, 2000 letter from Chief Greiner to Tony Huemiller; 
4. May 7, 1999 memo regarding towing; and 
5. Statement of Armando Aparicio. 
I understand from our telephone conversation that you will let me know if there are any additional 
documents to which you believe you are entitled. 
It is also my understanding from our telephone conversation that you will be requesting a 
continuance of the September 6-8, 2000 Civil Service Commission hearing. I have no objection 
to your request and understand that you will represent that to the Civil Service Commission in 
your letter. I would appreciate your providing me a copy of whatever you send to the 
Commission. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
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POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84147-0008 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Roger G. Segal 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
David S. Dolowitz 
Vernon L. Hopkinson 
John T. Morgan 
Keith W. Meade 
Ray M. Beck 
A.O. Headman, Jr 
Julie A. Bryan 
Erik Strindberg 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
Daniel J. Torkelson 
Leslie Van Frank 
Larry R. Keller 
A. Howard Lundgren 
Brian F. Roberts 
Dena C. Sarandos 
Lauren I. Scholnick 
Lauren R. Barros 
Brent Gordon 
July 18, 2001 
Stan Preston 
Attn: Judith Wolferts 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




This letter memorializes the agreement we reached yesterday evening, July 17, 2001, regarding 
production of the disciplinary documents. As I told you, I believe that we are entitled to complete copies of 
all the documents we requested without redactions. However, in an effort to bring this matter to some 
degree of closure, we have agreed to accept the redacted documents on the following terms: 
1. Notwithstanding the redactions, the City will not challenge the authenticity or admissibility 
of these documents. The City, of course, reserves its right to argue that the documents are 
not relevant; 
2. In regards to the one document which refers to Ogden Auto Body, the City will either 
provide us with a copy of the document in which the name Ogden Auto Body has not been 
redacted or will stipulate to the Commission that said document indeed references Ogden 
Auto Body; 
3. In regards to the files of former employees that we requested, you will provide us with 
redacted copies of those files for use in this matter. It is my understanding that you may 
request that the Commission take some extra steps to keep those files confidential and out 
of the public realm. 
If I have misstated our agreement in any way please contact me at once. Thanks for your help in 
getting this taken care of. 
Sincerely, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
ES:cd 
cc: Doug Holmes 
Erik Strindberg 
T T . M l . . 
REED L MARTINEAU 
DAVID W SLAGLE 
A. DENNIS NORTON 
ALLAN L LARSON 
JOHN E GATES 
R BRENT STEPHENS 
KIM R WILSON 
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DAVID G WILLIAMS 
REX E MADSEN 
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ROBERT H HENDERSON 
DAVID W SLAUGHTER 
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SHAWN E DRANEY 
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RODNEY R PARKER 
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ANDREW M MORSE 
CAMILLE N JOHNSON 
TERENCE L ROONEY 
DENNIS V DAHLE 
KOREY D RASMUSSEN 
HARRY H SOUVALL 
DAVID L PINKSTON 
JULIANNE BLANCH 
BRIAN P MILLER 
JUDITH D WOLFERTS 
KEITH A CALL 
KARA L PETTIT 
ELIZABETH L WILLEY 
SCOTT H MARTIN 
HEATHER S WHITE 
ROBERT R HARRISON 
ROBERTW THOMPSON 
ROBERT J SHELBY 
TRYSTAN B SMITH 
MARALYN M REGER 
KENNETH l_ REICH 
DARYL P SAM 
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A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 0 0 0 
T E L E P H O N E ( S O I ) 5 2 1 9 0 0 0 
F A C S I M I L E ( S O I ) 3 6 3 0 4 0 0 
H T T P / / W W W S C M L A W C O M 
THURMAN & SUTHERLAND 
THURMAN SUTHERLAND & KING 
THURMAN WEDGWOOD & IRVINE 
IRVINE SKEEN & THURMAN 
SKEEN THURMAN WORSLEY & SNOW 
WORSLEY SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
JOHN H SNOW 1917 1 9 8 0 
1 8 8 6 
1 8 8 8 
1 9 0 6 
1 9 2 3 
1 9 5 2 
1 9 6 7 
July 23, 2001 
OF COUNSEL 
HAROLD G CHRISTENSEN 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
WRITERS DIRECT NUMBER 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr. Strindberg, 
Pursuant to our agreement, enclosed are documents relating to former employee #2. The 
documents are bates-stamped 001220-001244, are stamped "confidential," and are submitted 
under the Stipulation of Confidentiality to which you have previously agreed. 
These documents have been redacted in the same general manner as the documents 
provided to you on July 17, 2001, as described in the July 17, 2001, letter that accompanied those 
documents In addition to the general redactions, highly personal and private information has 
been redacted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d). The person to whom this highly 
personal and private information applies is not the officer at issue. 
We are still working on documents related to former employee #12. There are a large 
number of documents involved, and we will get those to you as soon as possible. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JDW/db 
Enclosures 
cc: Andy Blackburn (w/o end.) 
Stanley J. Preston (w/o end.) 
Camille N. Johnson (w/o end.) 
N \13607\459\JDW\STRINDBE 013 
J U D I T H D WOLFERTS 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 8C MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84-14-5-5000 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 521 9 0 0 0 
FACSIMILE (801) 3 6 3 0 4 0 0 
July 27, 2001 
WRITERS DIRECT NUMBER 
( S O I ) 3 2 2 - 9 1 2 4 
VIA HAND-DELIVERY 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr. Strindberg, 
Pursuant to our agreement, enclosed are documents relating to former employee #12. 
The documents are bates-stamped 001245-001370, are stamped "confidential" in red, and are 
submitted under the Stipulation of Confidentiality to which you have previously agreed. 
These documents have been redacted in the same general manner as the documents 
provided to you on July 17, 2001, as described in the July 17, 2001, letter that accompanied those 
documents. In addition to the general redactions, highly personal and private information has 
been redacted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d). The person to whom this highly 
personal and private information applies is not the officer at issue. 
All documents are produced except the following: 
(a) An investigative report obtained from a federal agency. We believe we have no 
authority to disclose this, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-206 and § 63-2-
302(2)(d). The bulk of this involves a private party. 
(b) A confidential case/incident report obtained from a private corporation. We 
believe we have no authority to disclose this under at least Utah Code Ann. § 63-
2-302(2)(d). The report concerns a private party. 
JDW/db 
Enclosures 
cc Andy Blackburn (w/o end.) 
Stanley J. Preston (w/o end.) 
Camille N. Johnson (w/o end.) 
Very truly yours, 
I, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
J U D I T H D. WOLFERTS 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 8C MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 0 0 0 
TELEPHONE (801) 5 2 1 - 9 0 0 0 
FACSIMILE (801) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 
July 30, 2001 
WRITERS DIRECT NUMBER-
(801) 322 -9124 
By Facsimile & Mail 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr. Strindberg, 
Your July 27, 2001 letter to us requested a copy of a May 7, 1999 memorandum from 
Chief Balls to Sgt. Phillips regarding towing. We sent a copy of that document (and a few other 
documents) to you on August 25, 2000, enclosed in a letter. Enclosed is a copy of the August 25, 
2000 letter and a copy of the May 7, 1999 memorandum sent to you at that time. We are also 
enclosing a copy of the May 7, 1999 memorandum, bates-stamped 000417. 
With regard to your request to review the original documents relating to the incident at 
29th and Madison, I have a call in to Ogden City to arrange that, and will let you know about that 
as soon as possible. 
Very truly yours, 




cc: Andy Blackburn (by facsimile) 
Stanley J. Preston 
Camille N. Johnson 
N:\13607\459\JDW\STRINDBE.015 
JUDITH D. WOLFERTS 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
lO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 0 0 0 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000 
FACSIMILE (SOI) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 
July 30, 2001 
WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER: 
( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 2 - 9 1 2 4 
By Facsimile 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr. Strindberg, 
We received your letter faxed to us at 5:05 p.m. on Friday, July 27, 2001, which discusses 
the documents that we are to provide to you concerning former employee #12. I have spoken to 
the runner who hand-delivered those documents to you on July 27, 2001, and he informed me that 
they were delivered to you at about 4:45 p.m. The 125 pages of documents are bates-stamped 
001245 through 001370, and "former #12" is hand-written in the top right-hand corner of each 
page. Please let us know if you did not receive these documents and we will provide you with 
another set. 
JDW/kp 
cc: Andy Blackburn (by facsimile) 
Stanley J. Preston 
Camille N. Johnson 
N-\13607\459\JDW\STRINDBE.016 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
DAVID W. SLAGLE 
A. DENNIS NORTON 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
JOHN E. GATES 
R. BRENT STEPHENS 
KIM R.WILSON 
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS 
REX E. MADSEN 
MAX D. WHEELER 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
DAVID W. SLAUGHTER 
STANLEY J. PRESTON 
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RODNEY R. PARKER 
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TERENCE L. ROONEY 
DENNIS V. DAHLE 
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HARRY H. SOUVALL 
DAVID L. PINKSTON 
JULIANNE BLANCH 
BRIAN P. MILLER 
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KEITH A. CALL 
KARA L. PETTIT 
SCOTT H. MARTIN 
HEATHER S. WHITE 
ROBERT R. HARRISON 
ROBERTW THOMPSON 
ROBERT J . SHELBY 
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MARALYN M. REGER 
KENNETH L REICH 
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JOHN H. SNOW 1917-1980 
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WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER: 
(801) 322-9126 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Erik: 
This is in response to your July 27, 2001 letter concerning whether you will need to 
subpoena current Ogden City employees for the hearing. We will do our best to produce all 
available employees without the necessity of a subpoena. Please provide us as soon as possible 
with a list of employees that you want to call, as well as the anticipated date and time you will 
want them to appear, so that we can determine if there will be any problem or scheduling conflicts 
in making the employees available. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stanley J. Preston 
SJP/JDW/kp 
cc: Andy Blackburn (via facsimile) 
Camille N. Johnson 
Judith D. Wolferts 
N:\13607\459\JDW\STRINDBE.017 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 8C MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84-145-5000 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 521-9000 
JUDITH D. WOLFERTS F A C S I M I L E ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 WRITERS DIRECT NUMBER: 
( S O I ) 3 2 2 - 9 1 2 4 
August 3, 2001 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr. Strindberg: 
Your associate, Cristina Ortega, and I recently went to the Ogden Police Department to 
examine the original copy of the report on the incident at 29th and Madison. We made 2 copies 
of that document, one of which Cristina initialed in the bottom right-hand corner of each page. 
We have bates stamped those two sets of documents, and are producing copies to you. The 
documents are bates stamped 001371-001383 (with Cristina's initials) and 001384-001396 
(without Cristina's initials). These documents are stamped "Confidential," and are submitted to 
you pursuant to the protective order to which you have stipulated. 
Very Truly Yours, 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JDW/kp 
cc. Andy Blackburn 
Stanley J. Preston 
Camille N. Johnson 
N:\13607\459VDW\STRTNDBE.020 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, C H R I S T E N S E N & MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000 
C A M I L L E N . J O H N S O N FACSIMILE (801)363-0400 WRITERS DIRECT NUMBER 
(801) 322-9119 
August 7, 2001 
VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL 
Erik Strindberg 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Erik: 
Please find enclosed a copy of a memorandum from Assistant Chief Marlin Balls to 
Chief Jon Greiner dated April 20, 2000. The document is bates-stamped 001397 and stamped 
"Confidential." 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
CNJ/cah 
Enclosure 
cc: Andy Blackburn 
Chief Jon J. Greiner 
Stanley J. Preston 





A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST FIRST SOUTH, 5th FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
(801) 532-2666 
(801) 355-1813 FAX 




POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84147-0008 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Roger G. Segal 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
David S. Dolowitz 
Vernon L. Hopkinson 
John T. Morgan 
Keith W. Meade 
Ray M. Beck 
A.O. Headman, Jr 
Julie A* Bryan 
Erik Strindberg 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
Daniel J. Torkelson 
Leslie Van Frank 
Larry R. Keller 
A. Howard Lundgren 
Brian F. Roberts 
Dena C. Sarandos 
Lauren I. Scholnick 
Lauren R. Barros 
Brent Gordon 
August 7, 2001 
Stan Preston 
Judith Wolferts 
Camille N. Johnson 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
Re: Ogden City v. Huemiller 
Dear Stan, Camille and Judy: 
Enclosed are the documents that you have not previously received that we will be 
introducing at the hearing in the above matter. Below is the list of the description of those 
documents: 
1. Cell phone box cover for telephone number 801-725-0447. 
2. 3/23/2000 check from Tony and Kelli Huemiller to AT&T Wireless. 
3. Home appraisal of Huemiller's residence at 1354 East 5150 South, dated 11/08/99. 
4. Motor vehicle name index and attached documentation regarding title and registration. 
5. Bulletin of Information regarding Huemiller promotions and transfers. 
6. Awards and letters of commendation for Tony Huemiller. 
7. Performance Appraisal Form from August 1997 to August 1998. 
8. Performance Appraisal Form dated 11/19/1997. 
9. Performance Appraisal Form from 1/96 to 7/96. 
10. Toxicology report reported February 29, 2000. 
11. Preliminary toxicology report dated 2/24/2000. 
12. Summary chart Huemiller-officer statistical reports. 
13. Summary chart - cell phone calls from accident scene. 
14. Ogden Police Department Policy and Procedure manual. 
fifep* 
22fca* 
Please contact me immediately if you have not received any of the above documents. 
Additionally, we are supplementing our exhibit list with the following documents: 
1. Bates No. 000143 
2. Bates No. 000843-000852. 
Sincerely, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
%Ur 
Lauren I. Scholnick 
Enclosures 






A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST FIRST SOUTH, 5th FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
(801) 532-2666 
(801) 35M813 FAX 




POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84147-0008 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Roger G. Segal 
Jeffrey L, Silveetrini 
David S. Dolowitz 
Vernon L, Hopkinson 
John T. Morgan 
Keith W. Meade 
Ray Af, Beck 
A C Headman, Jr 
Julie A. Bryan 
Erik Strindberg 
Jeffrey R. OriU 
Daniel J. Torkelson 
Leslie Van Frank 
Larry R, Keller 
A. Howard Lundgren 
Brian F. Roberts 
Dena C. Sarandos 
Lauren L Seholnick 
Lauren R. Barros 
Brent Gordon 




Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
363-0400 
Re: Ogden City v. Huemiller, re Witnesses 
Witnesses 
Dear Troika: 
Stan indicated that you would cooperate and make arrangements to have police officers 
who are still with the Department available for testimony on Monday, August 13, 2001. Could 
you please see that the following individuals are available Monday morning: B.L Mills, Scott 
McGregor, John Stubbs, Jon Greiner, and Randy Watt. 
If there is going to be any problem with having any of these individuals available, please let 
us know immediately. 
Sincerely, 







A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST HRST SOUTH, 5th FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH B4102 
|S01)532-26$<i 
fB€J) 355-1813 FAX 
(801) 364-3(302 FAX 
crp©crsJawj:am(e-mai() 
Mailing Aifdr&6 
POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
^4X47^1008 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Roger 0. Segal 
Jeffrey L. SilveBtrini 
David & DQIQWHZ 
Vtrnon L. Hopkinson 
John T. Morgan 
Keith W< Meade 
Ray M, Rvvk 
A-O. Wtadman, Jr 
Julie A. Bryan 
Erik StrlndhtrR 
Jeffrey Ft. Oriti 
Daniel J> Torhelso* 
Leslie. Van Frank 
Larry R. Keller 
A* Howard Lundgren 
Brian F, Roberts 
Den a C, SarandoB 
Lauren L Scholnick 
Latirvn R. Rarro# 
Brent Gordon 
August 8,2001 
via facsimile transmission 
363-0400 
Camille N. Johnson 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Huemf Uer v. Ogden Police Department 
Dear Camille: 
Two requests: First, we would like the actual tape of Tony Hu emitter's Garrily 
interview with Lieutenant Stubbs. Second, why don't we have a copy of Chris Weak! and's 
statement that he has given to Lieutenant Stubbs? We would also like a copy of that 
immediately. 
Please contact me if you have any questions. 
Sincerely, 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 






A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
52S EAST FIRST SOUTH, 5th FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
(801) 532-2666 
(601) 355-1813 FAX 
(801) 364-3002 FAX 
crs@crstew.com(e-mail) 
WTWW, crs law.c om(w eb & itc) 
Mailing Address 
POST OFFICE BOX U008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84147-0008 
Richard A. JRappaport 
Roger G. Segal 
Jeffrey L. Silveatvini 
David S. Dolowitz 
Vernon L. Hopkmaon 
John T, Morgan 
Keith W Meade 
Ray Af. Beck 
A.O, Headman, Jr 
Julie A, Bryan 
Erik Strindberg 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
Daniel J. Torkehon 
Le&liti Van Frank 
Larry R. Keller 
A. Howard Lundgren 
Brian F> Robert^ 
Dcna C. SarandoB 
Lauren I, Scholniek 
Lauren R. Barron 
Breni Gordon 
August 9, 2001 
Stan Preston 
Judith Wolferts 
Camille N. Johnson 
Snow, Chnstensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
363-0400 
Re: Ogden City v. Huemilkrl re Witnesses 
Witnesses 
Dear Stan, Judy & Camille; 
I just wanted to follow up on a few matters. As you know, we requested some additional 
documents, statements, etc, but we have not yet received them. Specifically, they are as follows: 
1. The second page of the letter which is marked as no, 353; 
2. The Statement of Chris Weakland; and, 
3. The tape of Tony'« Garrity Interview. 
Could you please see that we receive those as soon as possible. 
Additionally, I sent to Sxan? a day or two ago, a list of officers who we need to have available 
on Monday morning to testify, Those officers are B J. Mills, Scott McGregor, John Stubbs, Jon 
Greiner, and Randy Watt. I did receive confirmation today, by facsimile, that those officers will be 
available on Monday, Thank you. 
Finally, I am concerned that several police officers went to visit one of my witnesses. This was 
done in a very intimidating manner. Any contacts with witnesses should be limited to the three of you, 
or other members of your firm. 
Sincerely, 




SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 0 0 0 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000 
JUDITH D. WOLFERTS F A C S I M I L E ( S O I ) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER: 
( S O I ) 3 2 2 - 9 1 2 4 
August 9, 2001 
By Facsimile 
Lauren Scholnick 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Lauren: 
This is in response to your August 8, 2001 letter faxed to Camille Johnson. Camille was 
out of town on August 8th, but spoke to me this morning and asked me to respond to your letter. 
First, we have requested a copy of the tape of Mr. Huemiller's Garrity interview with Lt. Stubbs, 
and will call you to pick that up from us as soon as we have it. Second, Chris Weakland did not 
give a "statement" to Lt. Stubbs. Mr. Weakland spoke to Chief Randy Watt and investigator Rob 
Carpenter when they were conducting the initial investigation of Kelly Zaugg. On August 17, 
2000, we produced Lt. Watt's summary of his interview of Mr. Weakland to you, bates-stamped 
and subject to the Protective Order to which you had stipulated. 
Very Truly Yours, 
JSNQW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
/ Mdith D. Wfiblferts 
JDW/kp / 
cc. Andy Blackburn (by facsimile) 
Stanley J. Preston 
Camille N. Johnson 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 8C MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8414-5 5 0 0 0 
TELEPHONE (801) 521 9 0 0 0 
J U D I T H D W O L F E R T S FACSIMILE (SOI) 363 0400 WRITERS DIRECT NUMBER 
August 9, 2001 
By Facsimile 
Erik Strindberg, Esq 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr Strindberg 
You have asked us to let you know whether Officer B J Mills, Officer Scott McGregor, 
Lt John Stubbs, Chief Randy Watt, and Chief Jon Greiner will be available to testify Monday 
morning, August 13, 2001 This is to confirm that these witnesses will be available as you 
requested 
Very Truly Yours, 
/-SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JDW/kp 
cc Andy Blackburn (by facsimile) 




SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84-145-5000 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000 
JUDITH D. WOLFERTS F A C S I M I L E ( S O I ) 3 6 3 - 0 * 0 0 WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER: 
( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 2 - 9 1 2 * 
August 9, 2001 
By Facsimile and US Mail 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr. Strindberg: 
We have received the copy of the document that you bates-stamped as OGD-467 because 
your copy did not have a number. After investigating, we have determined that we bates-
stamped this document as 000468 but, during copying, the bates number must have been 
inadvertently cut off the copy provided to you. Please find enclosed for your files a copy of this 
document that is stamped "Confidential" and shows the bates number as 000468. 
Thank you for helping clear this up. 
Very Truly Yours, 
-SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
£/Judith D. Wolferts 
JDW/kp 
cc. Stanley J. Preston 
Camille N. Johnson 
N:\l 3607\459\JDW\STRINDBE.024 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8414.5-5000 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000 
JUDITH D. WOLFERTS F A C S I M I L E ( S O I ) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER: 
( 8 0 l ) 3 2 2 - 9 1 2 4 
August 10, 2001 
By Facsimile 
Lauren Scholnick 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Lauren: 
Chief Turner is back in the office today, and I have now had a chance to ask him about 
the document bates-stamped 000353. He did not think that the document had a second page, but 
contacted Wayne Tarwater, who originated the document, to make sure. Tarwater confirmed to 
Chief Turner that the document did not have a second page. 
Very Truly Yours, 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JDW/kp 
cc. Andy Blackburn (by facsimile) 
Stanley J. Preston 
Camille N. Johnson 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, C H R I S T E N S E N 8C M A R T I N E A U 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4-5000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8414 -5 -5000 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000 
D. WOLFERTS F A C S I M I L E ( S O I ) 3 6 3 - 0 ^ 0 0 WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER: 
( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 2 - 9 1 2 4 
August 10, 2001 
VIA FAX AND HAND DELIVERY 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Anthony Huemiller 
Dear Mr. Strindberg: 
Accompanying this letter are documents bates-stamped 001398 through 001403. 
Documents 001398 through 001402 are Chief Greiner's April 25, 2000 letter notifying Mr. 
Huemiller of the time and date of the Predetermination Hearing set for May 4, 2001, and the 
attachment thereto summarizing the allegations and findings of the investigation. The May 4, 
2000 hearing was rescheduled at Mr. Huemiller's request, and document 001403 is Chief 
Greiner's May 4, 2000 letter to Mr. Huemiller giving notice of the new time and date for hearing. 
These documents are stamped "confidential" and are submitted to you pursuant to the protective 
order to which you have stipulated. 
This letter is also to notify you that we are adding the above-referenced documents to our 
exhibit list for the hearing scheduled August 13-14, 2001. 
Very Truly Yours, 
JDW/kp 
cc. Andy Blackburn 
Stanley J. Preston 
Camille N. Johnson 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
£ith D. W o l f e d 
• • . I - • • • J . . * / , 
;^JSWX 
•'> m i l 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Chief Jon J. Greiacr 
2186 Lincoln Avenue, Ogdcn, Uuh 84401 
(801)629-8221 PAX (801) 629-8086 
April 25,2000 
Tony Huemiller 
1354 East 5150 South 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Dear Tony, 
I Imve received a written rt^rt concern 
your participation in those improprieties. Additionally, I have received a memorandum tram 
Assistant Chief Balls recommending that your employment with Ogdea City Police be 
terminated. I haven't had a chance to hear your side of the story, therefore, I have scheduled a 
predetennination hearing where you'll have a chance to hear and respond to the allegations and 
Assistant Chief Balls* recommendation. Also, attached is a summary of the investigation 
outlining the allegations and findings that caused this request from the Unifonn Division 
Commander wMchwitt be discajss^ The 





Jon J. Greiner, Chief of Police 
May 4,2000 
1300 hours 
Ogdcn City Police Department Conference Room (Chiefs) 
2186 Lincoln Avenue 
P1 ease be present at the hearing and have any evidence and witnesses there that you wish to be 
present You may be represented by anyone of your choice including an attorney. The hearing 
will be recorded. Please review enclosed Ogden City policy on predetermination hearings. 
If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned. 
Sincerely, 
Jon J. Gieincr 
Chief of Police 
Enclosures 
c: Andrew H, Blackburn, Assistant City Attorney 
Jim Bristow, Personnel Manager 





To: Assistant Chief Martin Bals 
From Lieutenant Steven Fl Watt 
CC: 
Date 04/21/00 
Re: Internal Affairs Investigation, relationship between Sgt Tony HuemiBer and Ogden Auto Body; 
Findings and Recommendations 
During the course of this investigation into the listed allegations, several other violations of 
policy and State of Utah law were identified. The initial allegations will be dealt with first, followed by 
violations of policy and law as identified through the investigative process. 
ALLEGATIONS: 
1. Officers of the Ogden Pofice Department specifically identified by the complainant, Jeff 
Wangsgard of Ron's Auto Body as Sgt. Tony Huemiller, Officer Ron VanBeekum and Officer 
Kelly Zaugg were improperly sending tow business to Tom and Clare Baur of Ogden Auto 
Body, in violation of the tow agreement between the Wrecker Association and Ogden City. 
2. The above named officers are receiving "kickbacks* of $75.00 to $175.00 per tow that they 
send to Ogden Auto Body. 
3. The above named officers have a 'special relationship" with Ogden Auto Body in which the 
Baur's provide gifts in return for the tow business sent to them. 
4. That the listed officers are "on the take*, to the detriment of free enterprise, namely the towing 
and auto body repair industry in Ogden City, and to the Ogden Police Department 
FINDINGS AS T n * C T i ^ " " J J S R i 
1. ABegation 1, SUSTAINED, investigation reveals evidence of the sending of unauthorized tows 
to Ogden Auto Body, by Sgt. Huemiller, in circumvention of directed Departmental poficies and 
procedures. 
References as follows; Part 2, Sea A., pg. 4; Part 2, Sec B.. pg. 2, pg. 3, pg. 5, pg. 10, pg. 
11; Part 2, Sec E, pg's. 1-11; Part 3, Sec. B., pg. 16-17; Part 4, Sec. B., pg. 3, pg. 29. 
• Pagel 
AAiirmrimii •0101299 
2. Allegation 2, UNFOUNDED: no evidence of cash payments to Sgt. Huemiller has been 
located. 
3. Allegation 3, SUSTAINED, there Is substantial evidence of -grfts*, to indude free cell phones, 
deals on vehides and vehide repairs, use of vehides with dealer plates and other favors 
provided to Sgt Huemiller, by Ogden Auto Body and Tom Baur, as a resutt of the practice of 
sending unauthorized tows to Ogden Auto Body. 
References as follows; Part 2, Sec. A., pg. 4; Part 2, Sec. B.f pg. 10-13; Part 2, Sea D.t pg's. 
1-13; Part 2, Sec. R, pg. 2, pg. 4; Part 4, Sec. B.f pg. 38; Part 5, Sec. B., pg. 1, pg. 10, pg. 14. 
4. Allegation 4, SUSTAINED, the 'spedal relationship" between Sgt. Huemiller and Ogden Auto 
Body is dearly viewed by outsiders as graft and the relationship has lead to substantial 
economic gain for Ogden Auto Body, as well as substantial economic loss for the other shops 
in the industry. 
VIOLATIONS OF POLICY BY SERGEANTTONVMtIFMI! t PR-
1. PoHcy 1, II, A., violations of the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, Law Enforcement Code of 
Conduct, Ogden Police Department Values. 
SUSTAINED 
Substantial evidence exists of Sgt HuemHIer dearly violating the Code of Conduct, induding 
lying, using the authority of the office for personal gain, and engaging in potentially illegal 
behavior. 
References: see Part 2, See's. D, E, F; Part 5, See's. A, B, C 
2. Policy 1, III, B, 3..."represent the department at all times and are subject to the same laws, 
ordinances and statutes as the citizens they protect". 
SUSTAINED 
Substantial evidence exists that Sgt. Huemiller has poorly represented the deoartment and 
that he has violated laws, ordinances and statutes, to wit, 41-1a-1101 (Driving Seized 
Vehides), 41-1 a-1303 (Driving Improperly Registered Vehide), 41-3-501 (Driving on Dealer 
Plates), 76-S-105 (Receding Bribe by a PubBc Servant), 10-3-1304 (Use of Office for Personal 
Benefit), 76-S-508 (Tampering with a VWtness) and 76-9-210 (Telephone harassment). 
References: see Part 2, See's. D, E, F; Part 5, See's. A, B, C 
3. Policy 1, III, E., ... officers must conduct themseh/es in a manner which does not bring 
discredit to them, the department or the City. 
SUSTAINED 
When the full report hits the press, as it wil do, the Ogden Police Department's reputation wil 
be substantially tarnished. 
4. Policy 1, III., G., 2, 4., Incompetence, ...bring discredit... fal to obey and folow the rules and 
regulations and personnel policies of the Ogden City Police Department.... 
• Page 2 
, nMPinPWTIAI I O I O W O O 
SUSTAINED 
Substantial evidence exists that Sgt. Huemiller has clearly violated this policy. 
References: see Part 2, See's. D, E, F; Part 5, See's. A, B, C 
5. Policy 1, III., R., 3, Gratuities. 
SUSTAINED 
Substantial evidence exists that Sgt. Huemiller received special gifts, gratuities and special 
benefits, in the form of car deals, use of vehicles, cell phones, etc., that were a direct result of 
the violation of the policy on tows. 
6. Policy 1, III., C , CompBance with Orders; to wit Memorandum dated May 31, 1995, entitled 
"Wrecker Requests', to aO offfcers, from Chief A.JC Greenwood, dearty specifying how 
wreckers were to be caHed to the scenes of accidents; training of officers by FTO's in the 
handling of tows, and clear departmental history and understanding of the handling of tows. 
Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force Poficy, as stated by LL Tarwater, not to operate seized 
vehicles for drug deals or for personal use. 
SUSTAINED 
Substantial evidence exists that SgL Huemiller knew that his actions and acfivifies in regards to 
tows were clearly outside departmental pofides and procedures and that he did them anyway. 
Sgt. HumBler admitted to knowing about the memo and proper procedures and admitted to 
vfolating the memo and the stated procedures after receiving the memo. SgL HuemBer 
admitted to driving seized vehicles during drug cases. 
References: see Part 2, See's. D, E, F; Part 5, See's. A, B, C 
7. PoRcy 12, V., EM Lying during questioning in an administrative investigation. Note: does not 
require that the employee Re under G&rity, only that the employee Be. 
SUSTAINED 
Clear evidence of lying under the previous investigations (Canity) and the currer.; ;i?/estigatk>n 
exists. 
References: see Part 2, See's. D, E, F; Part 5, See's. A, B, C 
8. Ogden Ciy Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual, Sec. IX, FM 2, several bullets. 
SUSTAINED 
9. Ogden City Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual, Sec. I, I., Conflcts of Interest, relating 
to acceptance of gifts if the gifts... tends to influence the employee in the discharge of his/her 
duties." 
SUSTAINED 
References: see Part 2, See's. D, E. F; Part 5, See's. A, B, C 
10. Ogden Ciy Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual, Sec. J., Acceptance of Gifts; 
pecuniary value of more than $50.00, 
• Page 3 nnwcinninii lo i tmot 
SUSTAINED 
Clear evidence of gifts, to wit, trips, car deals and cell phone bills, exist as a result of the 
special relationship regarding tows. 
References: see Part 2, See's. D, Et F; Part 5, See's. A, B, C 





Chief Jnn J. Grcincr 
2186 Lincoln Avenue, Ogden, Utah R4401 
(801)629-8221 FAX (801) 629-8086 
May 4,2000 
Tony Huemiller 
1354 East 5150 South 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Dear Tony, 
I have received a written report concerning alleged improprieties in relation to Ogden Auto and 
your participation in those improprieties. Additionally, I have received a memorandum from 
Assistant Chief Balls recommending that your employment with Ogden City Police be 
terminated. I haven't had a chance to hear your side of the 
predeterminalion hearing where you'll have a chance to hear and respond to the allegations and 
Assistant Chief Balls' recommendation. Also, in previous correspondence was a summary of the 
investigation outlining the allegations and findings that caused this i^uest from ' 
Division Commander which will be discussed in detail during the predetermination hearing. The 
predetermination hearing information is as follows: 
Hearing Officer: Jon J. Grciner, Chief of Police 
Date: May 11,2000 
Time: 1000 hours 
Place: Ogden City Police Department Conference Room (Chiefs) 
2186 Lincoln Avenue 
ANY FURTHER DELAY AND YOUR PAY STATUS WILL CHANGE TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE WITHOUT PAY UNTIL THIS IS RESOLVED. 
Please be present at the hearing and have any evidence and witnesses there that you wish to be 
present. You may be represented by anyone of your choice including an attorney. The hearing 
will be recorded. If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned. 
Sincerely, 
c: Andrew H, Blackburn, Assistant City Attorney 
Jim Bristow, Personnel Manager 
Marlin Balls, Assistant Chief of Police 
vuirirtpimn m i n i A0% 
